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We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock
exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New
York and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over
time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of Congress (SOX) in 2002. We
find that cross-listings have been falling on U.S. exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London.
This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics rather than by changes
in the benefits of cross-listings. We show that, after controlling for firm characteristics, there is no
deficit in cross-listing counts on U.S. exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the cross-listing premium
from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for U.S. exchange listings every year,
that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, that it persists even when allowing for
unobservable firm characteristics, and that there is a permanent premium in event time. In contrast,
there is no premium for London listings for any year. Cross-listing in the U.S. leads firms to increase
their capital-raising activity at home and abroad while a London listing has no such impact. Our evidence
is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits
for foreign firms. These benefits have not been seriously eroded by SOX and cannot be replicated
through a London listing.
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1. Introduction 
In 1998, the major New York exchanges (New York Stock Exchange, NYSE, American Stock 
Exchange, AMEX, and NASDAQ) collectively attracted 31% of all the foreign listings in the world, the 
London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) Main Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM) had 16%, and 
no other exchange had more than 7%.
1 In recent years, London’s market share of foreign listings has 
increased while the market share of the U.S. has fallen. It is now almost conventional wisdom in policy 
circles and in the financial press that London has become more competitive in attracting foreign listings 
than New York.
2 In this paper, we investigate how and why the flow of listings on the New York and 
London stock exchanges has evolved as it has and whether one should infer from this evolution that 
foreign corporations now find a New York exchange listing less attractive. 
A popular explanation for the decrease in foreign listings on the exchanges in New York is that the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of Congress in 2002 has made U.S. listings significantly less 
attractive to foreign companies – so much so, it is argued, that many listed firms would delist if it were 
easy to do so.
3 The argument is that SOX makes a U.S. listing less advantageous because it imposes 
severe costs on companies and their managers, especially through the compliance requirements of Section 
404, which aims to reduce the market impact of accounting “errors” from fraud, inadvertent 
misstatements, or omissions, by assuring effective management controls over reporting and which, in 
turn, creates significant legal exposures for companies as well as for executives.  
A number of observers have taken the view that a decrease in the flow of new listings in New York 
and an increase in the flow of new listings in London is, in and of itself, evidence that New York has 
                                                 
1 Technically, the listings of foreign firms are cross-listings of their existing shares in home markets. It has become 
common to refer to listings by foreign firms as foreign listings. In this paper, we use the term “foreign listing” to 
denote a cross-listing of the home-market shares of a firm in an market abroad. 
2 See, for example, the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Market Regulation (November 30, 2006) and 
several related news reports, such as “London calling” Forbes (May 8, 2006), “Wall Street: What went wrong?” The 
Economist (November 25, 2006), “Is a U.S. listing worth the effort?” Wall Street Journal (November 28, 2006), “Is 
Wall Street losing its competitive edge?” Wall Street Journal (December 2, 2006), and “In call to deregulate 
business, a global twist” Wall Street Journal (January 26, 2007). 
3 See, among others, Witmer (2006), Berger, Li, and Wong (2005), Hostak, Lys, and Yang (2006), Li (2006), 
Marosi and Massoud (2006), Smith (2006), Woo (2006), Zingales (2006), Piotroski and Srinivasan (2007), 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007), and Litvak (2006, 2007).   2
become less attractive.
4 A listing has both costs and benefits. If all firms for which it is advantageous to 
list in New York are already listed there and nothing else changes, we would not expect new listings in 
New York. In this case, this dearth of new listings in New York would not be evidence that New York 
has become less competitive. It would just be evidence that all firms that can benefit from a New York 
listing already have one. For the purpose of our analysis, we regard New York as having become less 
competitive if it no longer attracts listings it would have attracted in the past – say, for example, during 
the 1990s. 
A London listing is not the same as a New York listing; each listing location offers a unique bundle of 
attributes. For a firm to choose to cross-list when it was not cross-listed before, the attractiveness of a 
listing must have changed. The attractiveness of a listing to a firm can change because the bundle of 
attributes of the listing location has changed or because the firm itself changed so that a different bundle 
of attributes has become more attractive. Consequently, London listings could have become more 
attractive even if the bundle of attributes of a listing in New York did not change. After all, changes in 
firm characteristics may have rendered London listings more valuable for firms that did not yet have a 
listing. To use an analogy, an increase in Nice’s market share of the tourism market compared to St. 
Moritz’s does not necessarily mean that St. Moritz has become less competitive – it could just mean that 
the season has changed. Similarly, it could be that the firms that did not list in the U.S. in the 1990s have 
characteristics that now make a London listing advantageous compared to a U.S. listing. Such an outcome 
could be possible even if the New York exchanges are as competitive as ever in attracting listings from 
the types of firms that found these listings valuable in the 1990s. 
As reviewed in Karolyi (2006), there are many benefits to listing. In particular, through cross-listing, 
firms can access new investors, can have their stock traded on a more efficient market, can overcome 
barriers to international investment, and so on. However, much of the recent literature on cross-listings 
                                                 
4 The CEOs of both the NYSE and NASDAQ have also voiced their concerns about the costs that foreign companies 
have to bear to comply with SOX and the implications of these costs for the flow of listings (Thain, 2004; Greifeld, 
2006). See also “Taking their business elsewhere: Foreign companies are spurning U.S. exchanges” BusinessWeek 
(May 22, 2006).   3
has emphasized the governance benefit of cross-listing on a major U.S. exchange. By the term 
“governance benefit,” we mean the fact that firms that list on a U.S. exchange benefit from opting into the 
U.S. regulatory environment, which includes securities laws and regulations, regulatory oversight and 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and monitoring by “gatekeepers” such 
as analysts and institutional investors. We focus on this benefit because it crucially distinguishes among 
different types of listings and because the benefit of listing that most financial economists focused on in 
the past - namely, overcoming barriers to international investments - is losing its relevance in an 
increasingly global financial marketplace.
5 
The typical foreign firm has a controlling shareholder and comes from a country where controlling 
shareholders have more of an opportunity to make themselves better off at the expense of minority 
shareholders compared to the U.S. There is a governance benefit from cross-listing on a U.S. exchange 
because listing reduces controlling shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits from the corporations 
they control (see, e.g., Doidge, 2004, for empirical evidence). Some controlling shareholders are willing 
to bear the cost of better governance because it enables them to raise capital on better terms to fund their 
firm’s growth opportunities. Consequently, controlling shareholders trade off the cost of cross-listing, 
defined by the improved governance systems which reduce their private benefits, against the benefit of 
cross-listing, captured by their ability to fund growth opportunities on better terms. Only firms where the 
benefit more than offsets the cost will list in the U.S. As a result, U.S. cross-listed firms are worth more – 
there is a “cross-listing premium” (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). It will always be the case that many 
firms will choose not to list in the U.S. as long as, by not doing so, controlling shareholders have more 
freedom to run their corporations to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. 
                                                 
5 The bonding hypothesis, originally proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), predicts that after listing on 
a U.S. stock exchange, foreign firms become subject to more stringent investor protections and it becomes more 
difficult for insiders to expropriate from minority shareholders. Benos and Weisbach (2004) and Karolyi (2006) 
provide comprehensive surveys of the cross-listing literature and, in particular, of the emergence of corporate 
governance explanations of the cross-listing phenomenon.   4
For a listing on a U.S. exchange to have become less attractive, it has to be that the net benefit from 
such a listing for a firm with given characteristics has fallen. The net benefit from a listing on a U.S. 
exchange that is relevant for the listing decision is the gain made by the controlling shareholder of a 
corporation from listing in New York rather than listing in London or not listing at all. If the costs for the 
controlling shareholder of a U.S. exchange cross-listing rise or if the benefits fall, there will be fewer new 
listings and the value of firms with listings will fall relative to the value of firms without listings. 
To examine if cross-listings on the major exchanges in New York have become less attractive, we 
first evaluate aggregate evidence on the market share of foreign listings in New York and London. 
Strikingly, the market share of the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ increased from 1998 to 2005 relative to 
the market share of the LSE’s Main Market. However, once the LSE’s Alternative Investment Market is 
taken into account, the picture changes and London’s market share increased relative to New York’s. 
Though the number of foreign listings in New York and on London’s Main Market has fallen in recent 
years, the total number of foreign listings in London has increased because of the increase in foreign 
listings on AIM. The number of listings on AIM has increased most dramatically in recent years: foreign 
listing counts increased from only 2 within one year of its launch in 1995 to 220 at the end of 2005. 
We show that, though the success of AIM is impressive, it is critical to understand that the typical 
firm that lists on AIM is a small firm that would not have listed on a U.S. exchange, either in the 1990s or 
in more recent years. Consequently, it is simply wrong to interpret the success of AIM and the resulting 
growth in market share of London as evidence of a decline in the attractiveness of U.S. exchanges. 
However, U.S. exchanges could have become less attractive because they no longer attract new listings 
that they would have attracted in the 1990s. We therefore examine next whether a firm with given 
characteristics is less likely to list on a major exchange in New York now than it would have been in the 
1990s. We find little evidence to support such a conclusion. In particular, we find that firm attributes that 
affect the listing decision are mostly the same now as they were then. Further, and strikingly, we find no 
evidence that the number of listed firms is smaller than that we would have expected based on how firms   5
made the choice to cross-list in the pre-SOX period before 2001. These results are sensitive to how we 
define the pre-SOX base period: as we adjust the base period to be more recent (e.g., 1997-2001 instead 
of 1990-2001), evidence of a shortfall in actual U.S. exchange listing counts emerges for 2004 and 2005. 
However, this additional evidence is of little help to those who blame the SOX legislation, because we 
uncover a larger shortfall among London exchange listing counts. 
If New York has become less attractive, we would expect the cross-listing premium originally 
uncovered by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) to decrease, everything else remaining constant. We 
investigate this hypothesis in several steps. We first estimate the listing premium on U.S. exchanges every 
year from 1990 to 2005. Not only is this premium significantly positive every year, but there is no 
convincing evidence in our data that it has fallen in recent years. Next, we test and confirm that there is no 
evidence that the listing premium in New York decreased relative to the listing premium in London. In 
fact, we show that there is no listing premium in London over the 1990 to 2005 period. Consequently, 
firms that list in London do so for reasons other than for a governance benefit. Our conclusions on the 
listing premium hold using several different estimation approaches, including an approach that allows for 
unobservable firm characteristics to influence the valuation of firms. Thus, the listing premium in our 
approach does not proxy inadvertently for such characteristics. Finally, we show that the listing premium 
on U.S. exchanges is not a temporary phenomenon but that it is permanent. 
It is surprising that we find no evidence of a cross-listing premium in London, but this result is fully 
consistent with our evidence on the actions of firms following a listing. Earlier work by Reese and 
Weisbach (2002) shows that, following a U.S. cross-listing, firms raise more funds, both in their home 
markets and abroad, than firms without such a listing because investors believe that they are better 
protected when investing in such firms. We build on the work of these authors by investigating the 
security issuance behavior of firms cross-listed in New York compared to firms cross-listed in London. 
We provide evidence that firms listed in New York raise more funds after the listing (including in the   6
home, U.S., U.K., and other markets) than firms that list in London, so that there is more evidence of a 
benefit of listing for firms that list in New York than for firms that list in London. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data and show the evolution of the 
number of listings over time across types of listings in New York and London. We compare the 
characteristics of new cross-listings in New York and London in Section 3. We then examine in Section 4 
the determinants of the listing decision in New York and London and investigate whether there are fewer 
New York listings in recent years than we would expect given how firms made their listing decision in the 
1990s. In Section 5, we report evidence on the listing premium over time across types of listings. In 
Section 6, we show the capital raising activities of firms before and after listings in New York and 
London. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. The evolution of cross-listings in New York and London over time 
Before we commence with a detailed examination of the cross-listing flows in New York and London 
over time, it is useful to first show the importance of New York and London in the world of cross-listings 
using data from the World Federation of Stock Exchanges (WFE). These data rely on reports from 
member exchanges of the Federation and include companies which have shares listed on a specific 
exchange, excluding investment funds and unit trusts. Companies with multiple classes of shares are 
counted once. The Federation reports separately data for major exchanges, for markets specifically 
designed for small and medium sized enterprises (such as London’s AIM), and other markets (such as 
affiliated and correspondent exchanges that are not members). 
Figure 1 shows that New York and London have attracted the lion’s share of foreign listings during 
the past decade relative to the other exchanges that are members of the Federation. In 1998 (Figure 1a), 
the LSE’s 466 foreign listings together with AIM’s 21 listings constituted 16% of the 2,978 foreign 
listings around the world, and those on the three major exchanges in New York totaled 894, or 30% of the 
total. The next three largest exchanges in terms of the global market share of foreign listings in 1998 were   7
the Luxembourg exchange (7%), Deutsche Börse (7%), and the Swiss exchange (6%). By 2005, London’s 
Main Market and AIM exchanges increased their global market share to 19% thanks to the growth of 
AIM (220 listings, or 8% global market share). The New York-based exchanges together maintained their 
30% market share (884 listings out of the 2,929 globally). Both the Deutsche Börse and the Swiss 
Exchange lost market share (4%) and, though Euronext (a consolidation of the former Paris, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, and Lisbon bourses) emerged as the next largest with a 10% global market share, its market 
share was actually lower than what it would have been in 1998 (15%).
6 
Figure 1b shows that, by 2005, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE had increased their market share 
relative to London’s Main Market. In 1998, the New York exchanges had 92% more foreign listings than 
London. But, by 2005, the New York exchanges had 165% more foreign listings than London’s Main 
Market. However, when we include the foreign listing counts on AIM in addition to the LSE’s Main 
Market, the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ had only 60% more foreign listings than London in 2005. The 
growth of the share of foreign listings of London is due fully to a dramatic increase in AIM that offsets a 
decrease in foreign listings on London’s Main Market. Over the period from 1998 to 2005, the Main 
Market’s foreign listings dropped from 466 to 334, while those on AIM jumped from 4 to 220. 
The data from the WFE cannot be used to assess whether London’s increased market share relative to 
New York’s implies that New York is now less attractive. The WFE provides aggregate data only, which 
makes it impossible to track the characteristics of listed firms by type of listing and to evaluate the 
success of New York and London in attracting new listings and retaining existing listings. It could be 
therefore that London was more successful in attracting new listings on the Main Market than were the 
exchanges in New York, but this increased competitiveness of London is not discernible with aggregate 
data on listing counts. The WFE data also ignores listings that do not take place on the exchanges but are 
important in the U.S.: namely, Rule 144a private placements and OTC listings. For our analysis, it is 
                                                 
6 Of course, this decline may be over-estimated because the sum of foreign listings of the Paris, Brussels, 
Amsterdam, and Lisbon stock exchanges in 1998 ignores double-counting of cross-listings among the four 
exchanges, which would not have been included in the 2005 Euronext count.   8
therefore necessary for us to construct a database that tracks listings at the firm-level and distinctly by 
listing type. Before we turn to the construction of that database, however, we review the types of listings 
available in New York and in London and the implications of these types of listings for corporate 
governance. 
 
2.1. Regulatory and listing requirements for foreign listings in New York and London 
To understand the corporate governance and regulatory implications of listing in New York and 
London, it is important to make a distinction between listing rules required by the exchanges, the laws 
and regulations that listed firms must satisfy, and, most importantly, the specific combination of listing 
rules, laws, and regulations that apply to foreign listed firms. 
Firms that list in the U.S. via Rule 144a or in the OTC market are exempt from SEC registration and 
many disclosure requirements and therefore face very few additional obligations when they list. In 
contrast, foreign firms that list on U.S. exchanges have to register with the SEC and become subject to 
U.S. securities laws. These laws not only increase disclosure and financial reporting requirements (e.g. 
reconciliation of financial accounts with U.S. GAAP and other disclosures), but also reduce agency costs 
and restrain controlling shareholders by imposing substantive obligations on them.
7 Since 2002, foreign 
firms listed on U.S. exchanges have been subject to some of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
8 In 
addition to the SEC’s requirements, foreign firms also have to satisfy the listing requirements and 
governance standards of the individual exchanges, although the exchanges can waive some of the 
governance standards on a case-by-case basis. In general, firms are subject to SEC oversight, they are 
                                                 
7 Because the regulatory and listing requirements for U.S. listings have been discussed extensively in the literature, 
our discussion of these requirements does not detail all of the specific rules. We refer readers to papers by Coffee 
(1999, 2002, 2007), Doidge (2004), and Greene, Beller, Rosen, Silverman, Braverman, and Sperber (2000) for a 
more complete discussion. 
8 Actually, reporting foreign companies initially were expected to comply with the internal control reporting 
provisions of Section 404 in connection with their fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2004. On February 24, 
2004, the SEC, in recognizing the importance of these provisions and the time needed to implement them properly, 
extended these compliance dates to fiscal years ending July 15, 2005. The deadlines were extended a second time on 
March 2, 2005 and a third time on September 22, 2005 for fiscal years ending July 15, 2007. See SEC Release No. 
33-8618 (Sept. 22, 2005) [70 FR 56825] at www.sec.gov.   9
exposed to class action lawsuits, and face additional monitoring by market participants, such as analysts 
and institutional investors. The bottom line is that controlling shareholders of foreign firms that list on a 
U.S. exchange face more constraints and obligations than controlling shareholders of similar firms that 
are not listed. 
In London, firms can list on the Main Market as a Depositary Receipt (DR) or ordinary issue or they 
can list on the Alternative Investment Market. There are different requirements for each listing type.
9 
Firms that list as ordinary issues must be admitted to listing by the U.K. Listing Authority (UKLA), part 
of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and then be admitted to trading by the LSE. Most foreign 
firms that list as ordinary issues in London seek a “secondary” listing (the “primary listing” being the 
home market – foreign firms typically do not incorporate in the U.K.). In general, the provisions of the 
UKLA’s listing rules that seek to protect minority investors do not apply to foreign firms with a 
secondary listing (Coffee, 2007).
10 For example, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance applies 
only to companies incorporated in the U.K., which means that firms with foreign listings are not required 
to comply with the code.
11 Moreover, these firms are not required to explain why they have chosen not to 
comply. The main requirement for firms with ordinary listings on the Main Market is to file financial 
information prepared in accordance with U.K. or U.S. GAAP or International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), although exceptions are made to this requirement in some cases. For example, the UKLA will 
accept local accounting standards from Japanese firms. The requirements for firms that list on the Main 
                                                 
9 See “Listing in London: Listing depositary receipts” (2000, 2003), “Listing in London: Listing shares” (2000), 
“How to Join the London Markets” (2001), “A guide for Japanese companies listing on the London Stock 
Exchange” (2003), “London Stock Exchange Admission and Disclosure Standards” (2005), and “Joining AIM: A 
Professional Handbook” (2005), all published by the London Stock Exchange. Additional details on the listing and 
reporting requirements of the U.K. Listing Authority can be found in the “Index to Listing, Disclosure and 
Prospectus Rules” (particularly LR 18.1 – 18.4 and 19.1 – 19.3) at the U.K. Financial Services Agency website 
(http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/D85). 
10 See MacNeil and Lau (2001) for further details on listing requirements. They conclude that the considerable 
exceptions from the listing rules made for foreign firms suggests a deliberate policy of competing for foreign listings 
and that bonding is not the main explanation for London’s success in attracting foreign listings. 
11 The Cadbury Report, published in 1992 included a “Code of Best Practice”. In 1998, the Hampel Report led to the 
publication of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (“Combined Code”). The Combined Code, which is 
annexed to the UKLA’s listing rules, contains two sections, “Principals of good governance” and “Code of best 
practice.” In 2003, the code was further revised.   10
Market via DRs are even less demanding than those for ordinary listings in that financial information 
need not be prepared in accordance with IAS, U.K., or U.S. GAAP.
12 
Firms listing in London can also choose to list on AIM. It is well-known that listing requirements on 
AIM are minimal – there is no prior trading requirement, prior shareholder approval for transactions is not 
required, admission documents are not pre-vetted by the exchange or by the UKLA, there is no minimum 
market capitalization, and there is no minimum public float requirement. In fact, all that is required for a 
firm to be admitted to AIM is that it has the support of a nominated advisor (“Nomad”) and subsequently 
the firm has to satisfy only the exchange’s weak disclosure duty. AIM rules impose a “general duty of 
disclosure requiring information which it (the issuer) reasonably considers necessary to enable investors 
to form a full understanding of the financial position of the applicant.” Although there is a common belief 
that listing in London provides a certain level of good governance, firms with foreign listings in London 
generally need only comply with the governance rules of their home country. That is, firms with foreign 
listings in London are subject to a “light touch” approach to regulation. Recently, institutional investors 
expressed concerns to the FSA about the governance standards of foreign firms listing in the U.K. In 
April 2007, the FSA announced a plan to review the rules which apply to foreign listings and to consider 
stricter rules for foreign listings on the LSE.
13 
 
2.2. Data sources on foreign listings in New York and London 
To conduct our study, we construct a dataset that contains information on firms’ listing decisions, 
firm characteristics, as well as home country characteristics. Our first step is to construct a list of firms 
that have foreign listings in the U.S. or in the U.K., at the end of each year from 1990 through 2005. 
Firms can cross-list in the U.S. by means of a Rule 144a private placement, an OTC listing as Bulletin 
                                                 
12 Most firms issue Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), which cannot be traded by ordinary retail investors. 
Recently, the LSE introduced Retail Depositary Receipts (RDRs). Because these can be traded by all investors, the 
listing requirements are more stringent and are similar to those for ordinary issues. To date, few firms have chosen 
to list RDRs. 
13 See “Firms list in UK to avoid tough US standards” Reuters News (February 3, 2006); “FSA to act on foreign IPO 
concerns” FT.com, (April 5, 2007); and “Regulator to review London listings for foreign firms” The Guardian 
(April 5, 2007).   11
Board (OTCBB) or Pink Sheet issues, or on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. We keep track of listings 
on U.S. exchanges that are created as direct listings, New York Registered Shares, or as Level II or Level 
III (capital raising) ADR programs. Firms can cross-list in the U.K. on the Main Market via depositary 
receipts or an ordinary listing. Starting in 1995, firms could also choose to list on AIM. 
Information on foreign listings comes from a variety of sources, including the Bank of New York, 
Citibank, JP Morgan, the NYSE, NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange, the OTCBB, end-of-year 
editions of the National Quotation Bureau’s Pink Sheets, the Center for Research on Security Prices 
(CRSP), firms’ annual reports, SEC Form 20-F filings, and Factiva searches. Information from the 
various datasets is manually cross-checked and verified. The data provided by Citibank and CRSP allows 
us to keep track of both active and inactive issues for U.S. listings, which mitigates concerns about 
survivorship bias. However, a limitation of the data provided by the London Stock Exchange is that the 
earliest information on Main Market listings we are able to obtain is from 1997. Further, that list contains 
only firms that were listed as of 1997. As such, we are unable to verify that we have the complete list of 
U.K. listings prior to that year. Our list in 1997 and later years is complete, however. 
In addition to listing dates, we also keep track of changes in firms’ foreign listing status, either 
through upgrades, downgrades, or delistings. If a firm upgrades from a Rule 144a private placement or 
OTC listing to a U.S. exchange listing, the upgrade is counted as a new U.S. exchange listing and as a 
delisting from the Rule 144a or OTC markets. Firms that change their listing location are assigned to a 
listing type according to their status as of December 31 of the year, regardless of when the change took 
place during the year. Firms’ foreign listings are frequently terminated and we keep track of the dates on 
which a firm delists. For firms that delist from a U.S. stock exchange or from an ordinary listing in the 
U.K., we also record the reason for delisting. A delisting is classified as “voluntary” if a firm is in 
compliance with an exchange’s listing standards and voluntarily takes steps to delist its shares or 
depositary receipts. Firms are also delisted when they are acquired and these cases are classified as a 
“merger/acquisition.” The final category is “other.” This includes cases where firms are delisted when   12
they fail to meet their exchange’s listing requirements, when firms are bankrupt, in financial distress, or 
are undergoing some kind of restructuring or liquidation. 
 
2.3. The time-series of listings: levels and flows 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the total number of cross-listings from 1990 to 2005 in the 
U.S. (separately by Rule 144, OTC, and exchange listings) and in the U.K. (separately by AIM, DRs, and 
ordinary shares).
14 The number of exchange listings in the U.S. peaks in 2000 at 960. The number of 
exchange listings increases each year before the peak and falls in all years afterwards except 2004. By 
2005, the number of listings had fallen by 94 from its peak, standing at 866. The number of OTC listings 
peaks in 2002 at 993. Though the number of OTC listings increases monotonically from 1990 to 2002, it 
falls by 98 listings in 2003 and then stays close to that number until 2005. Finally, the number of Rule 
144a issues reached its peak of 312 in 2005, but there is little variation in the number of Rule 144a issues 
from 1999 to 2005. In the U.K., there has been a steady decline in DR and ordinary listing counts since 
1997 from a peak of 491 to only 327 in 2005. AIM listings jumped dramatically in 2004 and 2005 to 242 
following a slow, steady increase over the 1995 to 2003 period. So, foreign listing counts have been 
steadily decreasing on the major exchanges in New York since 2001 and the Main Market in London 
since 1998. The listing counts on the Rule 144a and OTC markets in the U.S. have held steady and those 
on AIM in London have been increasing, especially in 2004 and 2005. 
Table 2 presents the flows of new listings and delistings that correspond to the listing counts in Table 
1. These data are again reported by year for New York and London and by type of listing. The biggest 
years on record for new listings on U.S. exchanges were 2000 (164), which coincides with the peak 
foreign listing count, as well as 1996 and 1997. The new listings have slowed since 2000. Interestingly, 
the pace of delistings rose from a level that averaged 25% of new foreign listings to 50% between 1998 
                                                 
14 The exchange listing counts are almost identical to those reported in the WFE statistics (the Rule 144a and OTC 
counts are not reported by WFE). The LSE Main Market counts are very similar to those reported by the Exchange 
to WFE, although the differences widen for 1995. As noted earlier, we were unable to obtain annual listing counts 
directly from the LSE prior to 1997.   13
and 2000, and, finally, to a level over 100% of new foreign listings after 2001. New foreign listings on the 
OTC market peaked in 2001 (205 in total) and in only one year (2003) has the pace of OTC foreign 
delistings exceeded that of new listings. Similarly, there have been only two years (2001-2002) in which 
foreign delistings from the Rule 144a market have exceeded those of new listings, but the delisting rate 
has distinctly risen since 1999. The annual rates of new foreign listings in London on the Main Market 
have slowed since 1996 for DRs and since 2000 for ordinary shares. Like the New York exchange 
listings, the pace of delistings in London has increased since 1999 to the point where the delisting rate 
exceeds (and often more than doubles) the rate of new listings in each year. The AIM market represents a 
distinct exception with few delistings relative to the high rate of new listings.  
Table 3 breaks out the cumulative count of new listings over the period from 1990 to 2005 by 
country. Canadian and U.K firms dominate the new OTC and exchange listings in New York. Together, 
they comprise 28% and 10%, respectively. India, Taiwan, Mexico, and South Korea have the greatest 
numbers of listings on the Rule 144a market. For ordinary listings on the LSE’s Main Market, Irish firms 
are well represented (58 firms), as well as those from Canada, Japan, and the United States.
15 As noted by 
Salva (2003), firms from developed countries are more likely to have an ordinary listing, while firms from 
emerging markets, such as India, Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan, dominate the DR market. Finally, 
Australian, Canadian, Irish, and U.S. firms dominate the AIM sample of new listings, constituting 
together over 61% of the total. 
Most delistings on the exchanges in New York and London over the 1990 to 2005 period are due to 
either mergers/acquisitions or for other reasons such as distress, restructuring, or failure to comply with 
the exchange’s listing standards. Table 4 presents the annual delisting flows for exchange listings in New 
York and for ordinary listings in London separately for voluntary, merger/acquisition, and other reasons. 
Overall, voluntary delistings represented only 13% (95 of 726 total delistings) in New York and 33% 
                                                 
15 There are also a substantial number of ordinary listings from tax-haven countries such as Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands. The raw data on foreign listings provided by the LSE contains investment funds and trusts and we 
include these in our listing counts. These mainly affect the listing counts from tax-haven countries, such as the 
Cayman Islands, where almost all of the foreign listings are funds or trusts.   14
(105 of 317 total delistings) in London.
16 If we include delistings by firms with DRs in London, the count 
of voluntary delistings in London is even higher. It is noteworthy that the rise in delisting activity since 
2000 has been mostly voluntary in nature. But, the salient fact is that the increase in annual delisting 
activity in recent years, measured as a fraction of the respective total number of outstanding foreign 
listings, has been somewhat greater in London than in New York (around 2% per year in New York and 
around 4% per year in London). The fact that voluntary delistings are easier in London than on the U.S. 
exchanges may explain the sharp increase in voluntary delistings in London compared to the increase in 
voluntary delistings in New York. 
What, then, can we learn from this analysis of listing counts and flows about the competitiveness of 
New York’s markets relative to London? Foreign listings increased sharply in both markets in the 1990s, 
but, after 2000, the numbers fell on the main exchanges both in London and in New York, as well as on 
the OTC market in the U.S. The shift resulted from both a decrease in the number of new listings and an 
increase in the number of voluntary delistings. In comparing the magnitudes of the new listings and 
delistings in both markets, there is no evidence that New York is losing market share of foreign cross-
listings to London. The growth and pace of the AIM market in the past decade, however, tilts the market 
share toward London. At first glance, the firms that are attracted to AIM appear to be those that are also 
attracted to the major exchanges in New York and London, at least in terms of their home markets. But, in 
order to judge the success of AIM as evidence of a potential decline in U.S. market competitiveness, we 
need to understand whether the typical firm that lists on AIM has similar characteristics to a firm that 
                                                 
16 Classification of voluntary and involuntary delistings can be complex. Our count of 95 voluntary delistings risks 
overstating the number of “true” voluntary delistings. Many firms are often close to financial distress so that what 
appears to be a firm’s choice may, in fact, simply be a pre-emptive action of an inevitable involuntary delisting by 
the exchange. We identify 14 (out of 95) cases, where the delisting is announced as voluntary, but coincides with 
financial difficulties, cost-cutting, or restructuring programs. For example, Germany’s Lion Bioscience delisted its 
ADRs from NASDAQ on December 22, 2004 at the same time when it forecasted operating losses, announced 
management changes, reductions in staff by half, and a major board restructuring. The U.K.’s Mid-States PLC 
simultaneously announced in July 1997 lower profits, restructured cash-management activity, and cost-cutting 
programs, including a delisting from NASDAQ. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007) use a conservative classification 
approach and uncover only 48 voluntary delistings from U.S. exchanges over the 1961-2004 period.   15
would have listed on a U.S. exchange in the 1990s. One of the goals of the next section is to answer this 
question. 
 
3. The characteristics of foreign listings in New York and London over time 
If New York has become less competitive, some firms that would have listed in New York in the 
1990s would not do so today. Consequently, we would expect the characteristics of firms that list to be 
different in recent years than they were in the 1990s. Previous research has established that larger, more 
profitable, and faster growing firms from countries with better-developed financial and legal institutions 
and economies are more likely to pursue U.S. listings, in the first place, and to do so on major exchanges 
rather than OTC or Rule 144a private placements, as predicted by theory (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). Less is known about the attributes 
of firms that pursue U.K. listings (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Salva, 2003). In this section, we 
investigate whether the characteristics of listing firms have changed over time and how these 
characteristics differ between firms that list in London versus those that list in New York. We also divide 
our sample into listings that took place before the end of 2001 and listings that were made after that year. 
During the first subperiod, listing counts on U.S. exchanges increase and then reach a plateau. In the 
second subperiod, delistings outpace new listings both in New York and in London (from Table 1, there 
are 960 listed firms on U.S. exchanges in 2000 and 950 in 2001). The choice of subperiod also 
corresponds roughly to a pre-SOX and a post-SOX period. 
Our data source for firm characteristics such as Tobin’s q, sales growth, total assets, ownership, 
leverage, and SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes is Thomson Financial’s Worldscope 
database. Therefore, we match our sample of foreign listings to Worldscope. Worldscope covers over 
24,000 public companies in more than 50 developed and emerging markets, representing more than 96 
percent of the market value of the world’s publicly traded companies. Although the Worldscope database 
provides the broadest available coverage of international companies, not all firms in our lists are covered   16
by Worldscope and many of the smaller countries listed in Table 3 (e.g., the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
among others) are not covered at all. 
Following the literature, we use Tobin’s q as our valuation measure and compute it as follows. For the 
numerator, we take the book value of total assets, subtract the book value of equity, and add the market 
value of equity. For the denominator, we use the book value of total assets. All variables are in local 
currency, although it makes no difference if we use local currency or U.S. dollars since the numerator and 
denominator are denominated in the same currency. Sales growth is measured as the two-year geometric 
average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in sales. Sales growth is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. Total assets are measured in millions of U.S. dollars and 
leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Ownership is the data item “Closely-held shares.” 
Worldscope defines closely-held shares as shares held by insiders, which include senior corporate officers 
and directors, and their immediate families, shares held in trusts, shares held by another corporation 
(except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by financial institutions), shares held by pension/benefit plans, 
and shares held by individuals who hold five percent or more of shares outstanding. In Japan, closely-held 
shares represent the holdings of the ten largest shareholders. For firms with more than one class of shares, 
closely-held shares for each class are added together. The ownership measure is far from perfect since it 
relies on information disclosed by firms and this disclosure is often voluntary and difficult to check. 
We also use a number of country-level variables in our analysis. For each country in each year, we 
obtain a measure of inflation from Datastream, which is the change in the CPI provided by the IMF. We 
adjust sales growth and total assets for inflation. We also use a number of variables to proxy for country 
characteristics. We use the anti-director rights variable from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006) as a measure of shareholder rights. Another proxy for home country investor protection is 
legal origin, from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). We construct a dummy 
variable, “Common”, that equals one for firms from countries with a common law tradition and equals 
zero for firms from countries with a civil law tradition. The rule of law index is a measure of enforcement   17
and is obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), although this variable is 
not available for China, Hungary, Poland, or Russia. We obtain values for the rule of law for these 
countries from Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000). As other authors before us, we define the variable 
“Legal” as the product of anti-director and rule of law. Stock market capitalization divided by GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) and Gross National Product (GNP) per capita is from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. 
Table 5 reports summary statistics on each of these characteristics for listed firms by type of listing in 
New York and London in the listing year and for non-listed firms over the full period. Panels a and c 
present results for the whole period (1990 – 2005) and panels b and d present results by subperiod (1990 – 
2001 or “Pre-SOX” versus 2002 – 2005 or “Post-SOX” periods). The count of firms and the medians of 
these attributes are reported as well as Wilcoxon rank-sum statistics, which test whether two different 
samples are from the same distribution across listing types or across subperiods. The tests across different 
listing types always compare attributes relative to the sample of U.S. exchange listed foreign firms. Panels 
a and b present the statistics for the entire sample of new cross-listings by non-U.S. firms that are in the 
Worldscope database whereas, in panels c and d, the statistics are reported for the subset of new cross-
listings by non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database with available 
data on firm characteristics a given year. To make firms comparable across countries, we exclude 
financial firms and require that firms have total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars). We also 
tried using a size cutoff of $10 million and find that our results are similar and this is true for all 
subsequent tables as well. Firms from tax-havens, such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, are excluded 
because, though they are foreign-domiciled firms, they typically have their listing in New York or 
London rather than a cross-listing and are foreign firms only for tax purposes. U.S. and U.K. firms are 
excluded because they are domiciled in the target host markets for foreign listings. 
Panel a of Table 5 confirms the fact that, in the listing year, the foreign firms attracted to the 
exchanges in New York and London are large (median total assets between $600 and $700 million for   18
U.S. exchange-listed firms and for London ordinaries), fast growing with trailing two-year annualized 
sales growth figures in excess of 14%, moderately leveraged (less than 20% of debt to total assets), and 
have somewhat concentrated ownership structures.
17 There are mostly statistically significant and 
economically large differences in size, sales growth, and leverage between U.S. and U.K. exchange-listed 
firms and their counterparts on the Rule 144a/OTC markets in New York and AIM listings (median size 
of only $11.5 million, sales growth of 10%, and median leverage of 0%). The differences in size between 
firms listing on U.S. exchanges and those listing on AIM are striking. Only 11% of the firms listing on 
AMEX, 5.5% of firms listing on NASDAQ, and none of the firms listing on the NYSE had total assets 
less than the median total assets of firms listing on AIM. 
The firms that are attracted to the U.S.’s Rule 144a market and LSE’s DR market are larger firms 
than those that cross-list on U.S. exchanges or as ordinaries in the U.K., have notably higher fractions of 
closely-held shares, and are also more likely to come from less-developed countries with lower GNP per 
capita, lower market capitalization-to-GDP ratios, and lower scores on legal protections of minority 
shareholders. Finally, there are statistically significant differences in Tobin’s q valuation ratios not only 
between U.S. exchange listings and Rule 144a/OTC firms (median ratios of 1.56 versus 1.35), but also 
between AIM firms and London’s Main Market listings (median of 2.01 versus 1.35 for DRs and ordinary 
shares). The striking result is that AIM firms have extremely large q ratios in the listing year, compared to 
those that choose any other way to cross-list. However, these are small firms concentrated in a few high q 
industries. Panel c, which repeats the analysis of panel a with more stringent data requirements, tighter 
size screens, and without U.K. and tax-haven-domiciled firms, indicates that the valuation difference 
between AIM and Main Market firms disappears as firm size becomes more comparable.
18 Finally, in the 
                                                 
17 Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2007) show that more shares are held by controlling shareholders in 
firms that are not cross-listed than in firms that are cross-listed. The data used in their study uses ownership by 
controlling shareholders, so it is not directly comparable to the blockholder data we use. 
18 No doubt that much of any statistical precision is lost because so many of the AIM firms are bound by the data 
and country screens (80 AIM firms in panel a reduce to only 5 AIM firms in panel c). Panel a shows that the median 
total assets of AIM firms is only $11.5 million and recall from Table 3 that 39 firms on AIM (18% of the sample) 
firms are from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.   19
listing year, the valuation of London-listed firms is indistinguishable from the valuation of U.S. exchange 
listed firms. 
Both panels a and c show that non-listed firms are quite different from U.S. exchange-listed firms. 
Not surprisingly, the number of non-listed firms (actually, firm-year counts) is extremely large compared 
to the total number of newly listed firms. The median total assets of non-listed firms correspond to less 
than 20% of the median total assets of U.S. exchange-listed firms. In fact, the median total assets of non-
listed firms are much smaller than the median total assets for all firms with a listing except relative to 
AIM firms which are one-tenth of the median total assets of non-listed firms. Non-listed firms have low 
sales growth, low Tobin’s q ratios, and high insider ownership compared to U.S. exchange-listed firms or 
even compared to other listed firms. 
The differences in listing year firm characteristics between the pre-SOX 1990-2001 and post-SOX 
2002-2005 periods are neither statistically nor economically large. Panel b shows that there are negligible 
differences in total assets (in constant 1990 dollars), leverage, ownership, sales growth, and even Tobin’s 
q ratios across the two subperiods. There are exceptions in the U.S. markets: foreign firms listing on the 
OTC market and on the major exchanges were smaller, had slightly lower sales growth, and less leverage 
in the post-SOX period. There is also some evidence that foreign firms on AIM were drawn from 
industries with higher median Tobin’s q ratios and from countries with better economic and financial 
development (GNP per capita and market capitalization/GDP ratios) after SOX. However, panel d with its 
more stringent data screen shows again that these differences disappear. Of course, one has to be cautious 
about interpreting changes across subperiods for AIM as there are so few listings before 2002. 
Strikingly, while the characteristics of newly listed firms on U.S. exchanges do not appear to change 
much from before to after SOX, the characteristics of non-listed firms change significantly. In particular, 
the typical non-listed firm has much smaller size in total assets and its Tobin’s q ratio falls. Though sales 
growth increases for non-listed firms, it is still very small compared to the sales growth of listed firms. As 
non-listed firms change, it is not surprising that their appetite for listings might change also.   20
Put together, this evidence on firm characteristics across listing types and across pre/post-SOX 
periods reveals that (a) the firms that are attracted to the major exchanges in New York and London are 
not very different, (b) the firms that are attracted to the Rule 144a/OTC markets in New York and AIM in 
London, however, are different from those that pursue exchange listings, and (c) little about these 
characteristics changes between the pre- and post-2001 periods, especially in the U.K. The evidence on 
the changes in characteristics of non-listed firms shows that the characteristics of these firms have 
changed. This evidence suggests that costs and benefits of listings have not changed and points to a 
decrease in the number of firms with characteristics that make listing attractive as the explanation for the 
decrease in the number of listings. However, simply looking at comparisons of medians is not convincing 
evidence. The next step in our analysis is to calibrate the new listing activity over time in Section 2 with 
the firm characteristics presented in this section using models of firm listing choices to see if the 
determinants of the listing choices are different across listing types and whether they have changed 
structurally over time. 
 
4. The determinants of listing choices 
If the rising-then-falling pattern of foreign listings on U.S. exchanges is explained by a decrease in 
the competitiveness of these exchanges, we would expect that firms make their listing decisions 
differently now than they used to, so that a firm with characteristics that made it likely to list in the past 
would be less likely to list now. In this section, we first examine the determinants of firms’ decisions to 
cross-list in the U.S. or U.K. using a competing-risks hazard model. Specifically, we estimate a model 
that simultaneously considers the determinants of listings in both the U.S. and the U.K. This allows us to 
test whether the factors that affect these listing choices differ. This first step helps us to understand which 
characteristics influence the different types of foreign listing outcomes in the U.S. and U.K. markets 
during the overall 1990-2005 period. Next, in order to evaluate the decline in the competitiveness of U.S.   21
markets, we examine whether the propensity of firms with given characteristics to list in the U.S. and 
U.K. changed after 2001. 
 
4.1. Competing risks models for New York and London listings 
The competing risks model we estimate extends the standard Cox (1972) proportional-hazard model 
developed for single event data to multiple event data. Although previous papers have estimated single-
event Cox models to investigate the factors that affect firms’ foreign listing decisions, they do not 
distinguish among different types of listings (Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, 
Miller, and Stulz, 2007). Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) model separately the probability of a 
European firm cross-listing in another European country or one of the U.S. exchanges or both in a year t, 
given that the firm has not yet listed. Other listing choices are not considered and after a firm lists abroad 
on one market or another, it is excluded from the model estimation because it is no longer “at risk” of 
listing. The key point is that the listing location choices are modeled with separate Cox models. With a 
competing-risks model where listing choices include both the U.S. and the U.K., a firm that lists on a U.S. 
exchange is no longer “at risk” of listing in the U.S., but it is still “at risk” of listing in the U.K. Similarly, 
a firm that lists in the U.K. would continue to be at risk of listing in the U.S. In other words, the listing 
location choices are modeled in the same Cox model. 
There are several variations of competing risks hazard models and the specific choice depends on the 
nature of the data being analyzed (Cleves, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). The case we 
analyze is sometimes referred to as “unordered failure events of different types” and the model we 
estimate is referred to as a stratified proportional hazard model. In our application, there are two possible 
failure events, cross-listing in the U.S. or listing in the U.K., and the listings can occur in either order. For 
each firm j, the model is specified as: 
( ) () () jk k k 0 jk t h t h x β x ′ = exp ,   22
where h0k(t) is the baseline hazard for the k
th event, xjk, is a vector of independent variables for the k
th 
event, and βk is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Therefore, the model allows both the baseline 
hazard and the parameter estimates to differ for U.S. and U.K. listings. 
To estimate this model, we follow the procedure outlined in Cleves (1999) and Lunn and McNeil 
(1995). Lunn and McNeil show that by augmenting the data using a duplication method, Cox models can 
be adapted to take account of multiple failure types. In our case, there are two failure types, given by δ 
equal to 0 or 1. The first failure type is listing in the U.S. (δ = 0) and the second is listing in the U.K. (δ = 
1). Because there are two failure types, each firm-year observation in the dataset should be duplicated 
once. For each pair of observations, the first observation is associated with U.S. listings and the second 
observation is associated with U.K. listings. Each year, each firm is at risk for both types of listings. 
However, if a firm lists in the U.S. (U.K.) it is no longer at risk for a U.S. (U.K.) listing and future 
observations associated with U.S. (U.K.) listings are removed from the dataset. However, the firm is still 
at risk for a U.K. (U.S.) listing so those observations remain in the dataset. If the firm later lists in the 
U.K. (U.S.), then any future observations for that firm would be removed from the dataset. 
We use this augmented dataset to estimate a stratified proportional-hazard model, with the 
stratification variable being δ (listing type) and the covariates being x for U.S. listings, together with their 
interactions, δ′x for U.K. listings. While estimating this model is equivalent to estimating proportional-
hazard models separately for each listing type (treating the other listing type as censored data), this 
approach allows us to test whether the estimated parameters for each listing type are different. 
In this “event time” experiment, we consider firms over the period from 1991 to 2005. The firm-level 
and country-level explanatory variables we use are given in Table 5, although we lag all variables by one 
year since we are trying to explain why a firm with specific characteristics at the end of one year chooses 
to list during the following year. Because variables are lagged by one year, we cannot use new listings in 
1990. We also remove from the sample firms that have a U.S. and U.K. listing prior to 1991. We report 
the coefficients in exponentiated form. The advantage of exponentiated coefficients is that they can be   23
interpreted as the effect of a unit change in the explanatory variable on the hazard. For example, an 
exponentiated coefficient of 1.2 (0.8) implies that a one unit increase (decrease) in the explanatory 
variable increases (decreases) the probability of cross-listing by 20 percent. The standard errors are 
adjusted for firm-level clustering, so that we assume errors are independent across firms, but not across 
time. 
In Table 6, we report the results. The first two models include all types of listings in the U.S. and 
U.K. and provide a broad comparison of firms that choose to list in each market. The next two models 
focus only on exchange listings in the U.S. and ordinary listings in the U.K. We focus on ordinary listings 
in the U.K. as they are the most comparable type of listing in London to exchange listings in New York. 
This choice should make it more difficult to find differences between New York and London listings, 
especially because the majority of firms that list as ordinaries in London are from developed markets. 
Models (1) and (3) report results that exclude the ownership variable and models (2) and (4) report results 
that include the ownership variable. Requiring data on lagged ownership imposes a tight constraint on the 
dataset, which is why we report both sets of results. In model (1), there are 573 new listings by firms in 
the U.S. and 39 new listings in the U.K. that have all the required data available and have total assets of at 
least $100 million (in 1990 dollars). In model (2), there are 425 new listings by firms in the U.S. and 30 
new listings in the U.K. By focusing only on exchange listings in models (3) and (4), the number of 
“failure” events is approximately halved. 
Overall, we find that large firms with positive sales growth in industries with high Tobin’s q ratios 
and from countries with better legal regimes for minority investors are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. 
and the U.K. markets. There are some differences in the exponentiated coefficients between the U.S. and 
U.K. listings, but none of them are statistically significant (likely a lack of precision due to so few U.K. 
listing events). For example, leveraged firms are less likely to pursue a U.S. listing and the larger positive 
coefficient on Log(Assets) and Legal for U.S. listings suggests a notably stronger bias for large firms and 
those from better legal regimes to list there. In model (2), the coefficient on ownership is significantly   24
below one for U.S. listings and not for U.K. listings, indicating that closely-held foreign firms are less 
likely to pursue a U.S. listing. 
When we replicate the competing risk estimation for exchange listings in New York and ordinary 
share listings in London, the important differences noted above widen and some even become statistically 
significant. For example, the positive coefficients on Legal widen further and the negative coefficient on 
ownership for U.S. listings in model (4) is significantly different from that for U.K. listings indicating that 
it is the major exchanges in New York, rather than the Rule 144a and OTC listings, that represent the 
primary deterrent for closely-held firms from poorer legal regimes at home. In fact, U.K. ordinary listings 
do not deter such firms at all. This latter result is important as it is consistent with the findings in Doidge, 
Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2007) and with the idea that U.S. listing choices tend to be significantly 
associated with a governance benefit. That is, if foreign firms with closely-held shares are, in fact, 
controlled by a dominant shareholder and if they come from a country where it is easier for the 
controlling shareholders to expropriate firm assets at the expense of minority shareholders, they are less 
likely to seek a listing on a U.S. exchange since the additional scrutiny of regulatory institutions, like the 
SEC, and more rigorous monitoring by various capital market participants makes it harder for them to run 
the corporations they control for their own private gain. 
 
4.2. Changing firm characteristics and the propensity to list in New York and London 
If New York has become less competitive in attracting foreign listings since 2001, perhaps because of 
the passage of SOX in 2002, the actual number of listing firms would have declined relative to what 
would have been expected based on information of how firms made listing choices before 2001. The 
expected number of listing firms is jointly a function of the propensity to list given certain firm 
characteristics and the changing characteristics of the eligible set of firms. We next estimate logistic 
regression models separately for U.S. and U.K. listings for the pre-SOX period (1990-2001) and then 
apply these estimated models to the pool of firms available in Worldscope in the post-SOX period to   25
estimate the expected fraction of these firms that would have listed had firms made listing decisions post-
SOX in the same way that they made these decisions pre-SOX.
19 Since the models are estimated in the 
1990s, variation in the expected fraction of listed firms after 2001 is due to the changing characteristics of 
sample firms. We then use the difference between the expected fraction of listed firms and the actual 
fraction to measure the change in the propensity to list in these markets. A decline in the competitiveness 
of the U.S. market for foreign listings should result in a smaller fraction of actual relative to the expected 
number of listings predicted by our model. As before, we focus only on exchange listings in the U.S. and 
ordinary listings on the Main Market in the U.K. as these are the primary competing venues that would 
have been affected by the changes due to SOX. 
Table 7 summarizes annual logit regressions that document the relation between the probability that a 
firm is listed and the firm’s sales growth, global industry Tobin’s q, size as Log(Assets), leverage, 
ownership, and the country variables Legal, Log(GNP), and the Stock market cap/GDP ratio, associated 
with the firm’s domicile. Following Fama and French (2001), rather than one overall regression, we 
estimate the logit regressions year-by-year and, in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973), we report the 
time-series means of the coefficients. To make inferences about the precision of these means, we use the 
time-series standard deviations of the coefficients, which allow for the correlation of the regression 
residuals across firms, and adjust for first-order serial correlation. Models (1) to (4) present results for the 
U.S. exchange listings and models (5) to (8) do so for U.K. ordinary share listings. The first two models 
in each set report average coefficients over the whole sample period (1990-2005) and the latter two 
models in each set report average coefficients by two subperiods. The full-period average slopes from the 
regressions confirm our inferences about the roles of sales growth, size, and leverage from the competing 
risk Cox models in Table 6. U.S. and U.K. exchange listings attract larger firms with positive sales 
growth, lower leverage, and less-closely-held ownership structures in industries with high median Tobin’s 
q ratios and from countries with stronger legal traditions. As in Table 6, the coefficients on sales growth 
                                                 
19 This approach is similar to the approach used by Fama and French (2001) to evaluate whether the propensity to 
pay dividends has declined.   26
are positive for U.S. exchange listings and they are negative (or insignificant) for U.K. ordinary listings. 
In these logit regressions the ownership coefficients are significantly negative for U.S. listings, as before, 
but it is surprising that they are also negative for the U.K. listings, which we did not see in the competing-
risk Cox models. 
In comparing the average slopes across the two subperiods, we see that most coefficients have the 
same sign and are similar in magnitude. Though none of the coefficients in the London regressions 
change signs, two of them in the U.S. exchange listing regression do. First, sales growth has a negative 
and statistically significant sign in the 2002-2005 period in contrast to a positive and statistically 
significant sign in the 1990-2001 period. Second, the market-capitalization-to-GDP coefficient has a 
statistically significant and positive sign in the second subperiod in contrast to a negative and statistically 
significant sign in the first subperiod. The negative sign on the sales growth coefficient is puzzling, since 
theory suggests that firms with better growth opportunities are more likely to seek an exchange listing. 
The average pseudo-R
2s are only moderately smaller in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX 
period for both U.S. and U.K. listings. Overall, except for the puzzling result on sales growth, these 
findings offer little evidence of changes in the characteristics of listing firms from the pre-SOX period to 
the post-SOX period. 
Section 2 showed that there has been a decline in the number of new listings on the exchanges in New 
York and on the Main Market in London in the past several years. If the propensity to list given certain 
firm characteristics has not changed as Table 7 indicates, the decline is due to the changing characteristics 
of firms. That is, fewer large firms with large asset size, positive sales growth, low leverage, less closely-
held ownership in high Tobin’s q industries are available in the population of firms to seek out U.S. or 
U.K. listings. We observed in Table 5 that there was precisely such an evolution in the population of non-
cross-listed firms. Table 8 shows the expected percent of U.S. and U.K. foreign listings. The expected 
percent of firms with a listing is computed by applying the average logit coefficients for 1990 to 2001 
(from Table 7) to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm each year between 2002 and 2005.   27
We obtain the predicted probability that a firm has an exchange listing each year, sum the predicted 
probabilities over firms each year, and divide by the number of firms in the sample that year to compute 
an expected percent. We also report the actual percent of listed firms in those years for comparison. Three 
sets of calculations are reported based on three different logit model specifications: (1) with firm-level 
attributes only, (2) with the three country-level variables only, and (3) with all explanatory variables. 
Strikingly, the actual listing percents are higher than expected for the U.S. exchange listings, while those 
for the U.K. listings are lower than expected. For example, in 2002 on the major U.S. exchanges, there 
were 343 listings, or 7.24% of 4,738 eligible firms in the Worldscope database (nonfinancial firms with 
over $100 million in assets and available data, from non-U.K., non-tax-haven countries) while the logit 
models would have predicted between 2.64% and 3.72% U.S. exchange listings. The economic magnitude 
of this difference is large: in terms of total firm counts, there are about 166 fewer expected listings than 
actual listings. The differences between actual and expected listing propensities for U.K. listings are 
smaller than those for U.S. listings; for example, there were 78 ordinary listings on the Main Market in 
2005, 1.63% of the 4,708 eligible firms, but more than 2.75% were expected to do so based on the 
propensity to list during the 1990-2001 period. Finally, it is interesting to note that the proportion of firms 
expected to be listed is very low in 2002 compared to the 1990s, but it increases thereafter. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the economic difficulties of the early 2000s had an impact on the demand for listings – in 
particular, they reduced growth opportunities and firms are more likely to list when they have good 
growth opportunities. 
We investigated further whether our inferences about the U.S. and U.K. expected listing counts in the 
post-SOX period are sensitive to the base period chosen to estimate the logit models which predict the 
expected percent of listed firms. If we use two recent subperiods, 1995-2001 or 1997-2001, instead of the 
full period, 1990-2001, the expected percent of U.S. listed firms does increase in the post-SOX period. 
The surplus of U.S. listed firms in 2002-2005 using the full-period logit model transforms into a small 
deficit (0.35%) of listed firms in 2005 using 1995-2001 as the base period for estimation and a larger   28
deficit for 2004 (0.98%) and 2005 (1.97%) for the 1997-2001 base period. However, as we use these 
more recent periods, the deficit of listed firms in London increases as well. Consequently, using a 
different base period does not change the conclusion that SOX did not make London more attractive 
relative to the U.S. exchanges for firms wishing to list on a foreign exchange.  
It is worth dwelling a bit more on these results. If firms could easily exit from the U.S. exchanges by 
delisting and deregistering and if the competitiveness of the U.S. exchanges had declined, we would 
observe missing listings. That is, firms predicted to have been listed based on their characteristics would 
not have been listed. Table 8 shows no missing listings. In fact, each year, there are more firms listed than 
predicted. One might argue that this reflects the difficulty that firms listed on U.S. exchanges face in 
removing themselves (technically, by terminating their registration with the SEC) from the obligations 
they are subject to from the time they list in a way that makes a delisting worthwhile.
20 With this 
argument, if firms had been able to deregister more easily, we would observe missing listings. This may 
well be true. In this case, our results would predict a steady decline of foreign listings on the U.S. 
exchanges. However, none of our evidence is consistent with the claim that London has become more 
competitive relative to New York. If London had become more competitive, we would expect that 
London would have more foreign listings compared to the number expected by extrapolating from the 
behavior of firms in the 1990s. Exactly the opposite is true. We expected to find a deficit in listing counts 
for the U.S. exchanges, but instead found it for ordinary listings on the Main Market in London. Put 
together, it is difficult to make a case for the decline in the competitiveness of the U.S. markets relative to 
the U.K. based on the propensity for foreign listings or changing firm and country characteristics. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Delisting from a U.S. exchange eliminates the obligation to meet the exchange’s listing requirements, but it does 
not eliminate SEC registration requirements. It is difficult for foreign firms to meet the SEC’s deregistration 
requirements, especially so for large firms with broad share ownership in the U.S. In fact, the rules governing 
deregistration are more arduous for foreign firms than they are for U.S. firms. See Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2006) 
and Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007) for further details on the specific requirements for delisting and for 
deregistering. On March 21, 2007, the SEC adopted amendments to the deregistration rules which ease the 
deregistration process for foreign firms.   29
5. The valuation premium for New York and London listings over time 
The governance benefit for a foreign firm listing on a U.S. exchange arises because controlling 
shareholders of such firms face more constraints on their ability to extract private benefits at the expense 
of public shareholders due to the U.S. investor-protection apparatus. For firms with valuable growth 
opportunities, the lower private benefits for controlling shareholders are more than offset by the fact that 
firms are now able to raise funds from public investors on better terms to finance these growth 
opportunities. As a result, U.S. cross-listed firms should be worth more because (1) they can take 
advantage of growth opportunities that they could not have taken advantage of without a listing and (2) a 
smaller fraction of the cash flows generated by the firms are appropriated as private benefits by insiders 
(Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Hail and Leuz, 2006). As firms take advantage of growth 
opportunities, we expect their Tobin’s q ratios to fall (see, for instance, Li, Livdan, and Zhang, 2007). So, 
the first source of the valuation effect of a listing does not persist. However, the second valuation effect 
persists. Consequently, on theoretical grounds, part of the high Tobin’s q ratios of firms at the time they 
list is temporary, but part is not. 
In this section, we investigate whether and how the relative valuation of listed firms has changed over 
time and across listing venues. If the net benefits for shareholders of a listing on a New York exchange 
has fallen, we would expect to see a decrease in the listing premium in New York, or at least a decrease in 
that premium relative to London. We therefore estimate cross-listing premiums from annual regressions 
of Tobin’s q on control variables based on firm characteristics and country-level factors each year from 
1990 to 2005. Previous research by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) established that there is premium, 
but their analysis focuses on U.S. listings in 1997 only. To our knowledge, no study has tested for the 
existence of a premium for U.K. foreign listings.
21 Because we have panel data, we can use firm fixed-
                                                 
21 Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) uncovered an insignificant negative abnormal share price reaction to foreign 
listings in London following a sizeable pre-listing run-up in returns (8.7% over the pre-listing year), but mostly in 
conjunction with increases in analyst coverage and media attention for those firms. Salva (2003) found a significant 
3.78% abnormal return for foreign listing announcements, but only for DR listings on the Main Market. A recent 
2006 study by Oxera, a U.K.-based consultancy, argued that “a listing in London may deliver higher valuations and   30
effects to account for unobservable firm characteristics. We expect that a permanent benefit accrues to 
firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. We therefore investigate our premise that there is a permanent 
premium associated with U.S. exchange listings. Finally, we perform a subperiod analysis of the cross-
listing premium comparing the pre-SOX 1990-2001 and post-SOX 2002-2005 periods. 
 
5.1. The cross-listing premium in New York and London over time 
Table 9 reports regression results of Tobin’s q on different dummy variables associated with various 
types of U.S. and U.K. listings as well as a set of firm characteristics, including sales growth, the median 
Tobin’s q of the global industry to which the firm belongs, total sales as size proxy, and country dummy 
variables. The regressions are estimated using OLS and the standard errors are clustered on countries – 
that is, observations are assumed to be independent across countries, but not within countries.
22 Panel a 
presents the regression results year-by-year across the 1990-2005 period and panel b provides panel data 
results using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methods, pooled OLS with firm-level clustering to compute the 
standard errors, and pooled OLS with firm fixed effects. The sample includes, as before, all non-financial, 
non-U.S., non-U.K. and non-tax-haven-country firms with available data in Worldscope with assets over 
$100 million. The size of this sample ranges from 2,764 firms in 1990 to 7,302 firms in 2005. The 
dummy variable associated with a given type of listing requires at least 10 listings with available data for 
q ratios as well as the independent variables, so, for example, Rule 144a listings are not considered until 
1992, U.K. DR listings until 1996, and U.K. AIM firms until 2005. 
Panel a shows that the cross-listing premium for U.S. exchange listings is large, positive, and 
statistically significant in each year from 1990 through 2005. The magnitude and precision of the 
premium is weaker in the first three years of the sample period, but it averages around 0.24 for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a lower cost of equity” than comparable listings in other markets, but provide no estimates other than discounts on 
IPOs (10-15% abnormal first-day returns), listing fees, and trading cost quotations. 
22 An alternative approach would be to estimate a country random-effects model following La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002). However, Hausman (1978) tests indicate that the assumptions of the model are 
not met in all years.   31
remainder of the sample period. Even after controlling for firm and country characteristics, the premium 
is economically large: compared to the average Tobin’s q ratios of firms that are not cross-listed, our 
estimates imply that firms listed on U.S. exchanges are worth about 17% more. There is no statistically 
significant cross-listing premium for U.S. Rule 144a private placements, except marginally so in the very 
early years of the program (1992-1993). Interestingly, there is a premium for OTC cross-listings in many 
years (12 of 16 years), although the overall magnitude averages around 0.13, which is about half that of 
cross-listings on the exchanges. This is consistent with the findings of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004). 
Most surprisingly, there is no discernible premium for U.K. cross-listings in any year of the sample period 
for any of the three types of listings (AIM, DR, or ordinary shares). In fact, the ordinary share and DR 
listings actually have cross-listing discounts (though insignificant) in 13 of the 16 years. The adjusted 
R
2’s are higher than those in previous studies likely because of the use of country dummy variables to 
account for cross-country variation. The firm-level control variables are also important with reliably 
positive coefficients on sales growth and global industry median Tobin’s q. Log(Sales) is a weaker 
control with a negative coefficient in the first seven years of the period and positive in more recent years. 
The results in Table 9 provide a first opportunity to assess whether the premium for a U.S. exchange 
listing has declined since the passage of SOX in 2002. Figure 2 presents another perspective in which we 
compare the valuation premium of cross-listed firms to the average q ratios of non-cross-listed firms. 
When we use the U.S. exchange coefficients from Table 9 and compute the percentage valuation 
difference relative to the average q of firms that are not cross-listed each year, we find that from 1990-
2001, U.S. exchange listed firms are worth an average of 17.5% more than firms that are not listed. From 
2002-2005, U.S. exchange listed firms are worth 14.3% more.
23 A t-test for the equality of means 
(unreported) indicates that the difference between 17.5% and 14.3% is not significant (p-value equals 
0.49). If we exclude 1999, arguably an anomalous year in terms of valuations, U.S. listed firms are worth 
                                                 
23 For example, in 1997, the coefficient in Table 9 is 0.22 and the average q of firms that are not cross-listed is 1.30. 
Therefore, in 1997, after controlling for firm and country characteristics, firms listed on U.S. exchanges are worth 
16.9% more.   32
15.4% more in the 1990-2001 period. This initial test suggests that the U.S. listing premium has not 
significantly declined after the passage of SOX. 
Firms are more likely to list if they have better growth opportunities. This means that firms with 
higher q ratios are more likely to list. The endogeneity of this firm choice leads to a “self-selection” 
problem that can, in turn, lead to econometric problems that induce an upward bias in our estimate of the 
valuation premium. This is mainly a concern for U.S. exchange listings because these are the only listings 
that have a positive and statistically significant premium each year. Previous studies of the valuation of 
cross-listed firms (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004) have handled this problem by estimating 
selection models (Heckman, 1979) which specify a separate selection (cross-listing) decision equation in 
addition to the observation (valuation) equation. In unreported tests, we investigated how our inferences 
about the valuation premium in panel a of Table 9 change when we employ a selection model. Our model 
(like that in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004) employs country variables like the market-capitalization-
to-GDP ratio, log of GNP per capita, and Legal as well as the firm’s log of sales. The premium remains 
positive in each of the 16 years of our sample period and statistically significant in all but four years. 
The estimates over the entire period from 1990-2005 are presented in panel b. The first set of results 
uses the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). We average the coefficients from the annual regressions 
of panel a and perform inference tests on the time-series means and standard deviations. The advantage of 
this procedure is that it incorporates unknown cross-correlation structure in residuals.
24 The estimates 
confirm the reliably positive and significant valuation premiums for U.S. OTC (0.12) and exchange 
listings (0.22) seen in panel a, the insignificant coefficients for U.S. Rule 144a private placements and 
U.K. DR listings, and a statistically significant discount (-0.05) for U.K. ordinary listings. The pooled 
OLS estimation (with standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms) with country and year fixed effects 
are almost identical to those of the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Finally, while the firm fixed-effects 
regressions (no country fixed effects, but year fixed effects retained) confirm the positive valuation 
                                                 
24 The t-statistics are adjusted for first order serial correlation. If we do not make this adjustment, the t-statistics are 
higher in all cases.   33
premiums for U.S. OTC and exchange listings – though much smaller in magnitude at 0.05 and 0.08, 
respectively – they now assert a reliably large negative premium for U.K. listings. The advantage of using 
firm fixed-effects is that we control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (not captured by our control 
variables), but the finding for U.K. listings is surprising and raises potential concerns about using fixed-
effects.
25 We do not include a dummy variable for AIM listings in these regressions because we can only 
include the dummy for 2005. 
Table 9 confirms that a U.S. cross-listing premium exists every year from 1990 to 2005 for exchange 
listed firms. We also have shown that there is a smaller premium for U.S. OTC listings, but this premium 
does not exist every year. Finally, there is no premium for U.S. Rule 144a listings or Main Market listings 
on the LSE, either DRs or ordinary listings. Moreover, we find no evidence that the premium for U.S. 
exchange listing firms has disappeared since SOX or that a premium has emerged in the U.K. The 
coefficient on AIM for the one year available (2005) is positive and large in magnitude, but it is not 
significant. There are simply too few firms listing on AIM that are not small firms to make much of the 
valuation of firms on AIM. 
 
5.2. Is the cross-listing premium permanent or transitory? 
We interpret the premium to reflect a permanent benefit that accrues to firms that list on U.S. 
exchanges. Recent literature raises concerns about such an interpretation. In an event-time analysis, 
Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2007) show that Tobin’s q valuation premiums for their 
“internationalized” firms disappear beyond the two years following the internationalization event. 
However, their internationalization events include other cross-listings besides U.S. exchange cross-
listings and hence include cross-listings for which a valuation premium is not predicted by theory. 
                                                 
25 A major concern with firm fixed effects is that, in de-meaning the dependent and independent variables in the 
regression, it is forced to measure only firm-specific time-variation in the premium and it ignores all cross-sectional 
variation across firms. For our analysis, many firms never cross-list on a U.S. or U.K. market so what little time-
series variation in mean-adjusted Tobin’s q ratios or other control variables that might be identified for the cross-
listing firms might be overwhelmed by the absence of it for the non-cross-listing firms.   34
Sarkissian and Schill (2007) examine long-run abnormal returns using standard event-study methods for 
1,256 cross-listings in 24 host countries around the world, including the U.S. (323 listings) and U.K. (191 
listings). They show how the negative post-listing abnormal returns for foreign listings in the U.S. 
markets, first observed by Foerster and Karolyi (2000), eliminate and outweigh the positive valuation 
gains achieved in the pre-listing and listing periods to render a net negative valuation impact.
26 
In Table 10, we re-examine whether the valuation premiums for U.S. exchange listings are transitory. 
In order to facilitate comparison, we follow the panel regression methodology of Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler as exhibited in their Figure 2 and Table 7. They estimate pooled OLS regressions of Tobin’s q 
with country and year fixed effects on a variety of control variables and dummy variables equal to one for 
firms in years with “internationalization” events, and separately within three years of such events. Their 
internationalization events, of course, are not directly comparable to our analysis of foreign listings in the 
U.S. and U.K., as they include international cross-listings in major financial centers (which include the 
U.S., U.K., and others like Frankfurt and Hong Kong) as well as global equity capital raising events 
through private or public placements. Panel a of Table 10 shows the count of the number of cross-listing 
firm observations in each of the three years around the listing events and separately for Rule 144a private 
placements, OTC, and exchange listings in the U.S. and for DRs and ordinary listings on the LSE. Given 
that our horizon of analysis begins in 1990, there are many firms that listed prior to that date, which is 
why we have so many observations in the “> 3 years after listing” category. The sample grows, as 
expected, over the course of the six-year event period as more firms cross-list on one of the two markets 
in one form or another over the 1990-2005 period. It should also be noted that the regressions include a 
benchmark sample of all non-cross-listing firms. 
Panel b presents the estimation results. In each Tobin’s q regression, the form of U.S. or U.K. cross-
listing event is examined one at a time relative to the benchmark of non-cross-listing firms. There are 
several important findings. First, for each type of listing and in both markets, there is a significant 
                                                 
26 One of the earliest studies to uncover the increases and then decreases in valuation ratios around U.S. cross-
listings is actually by Sundaram and Logue (1996), which pre-dates the current studies by a decade.   35
increase in the Tobin’s q valuation premiums in the years leading up to the listing and a decrease in the 
premiums in the years following the listing. Second, the increase arises for all three types of U.S. listings 
and DRs in London, but not for ordinary shares in London. More importantly, however, the magnitude of 
the increase in the premium during the pre-listing period is considerably greater for the U.S. exchange 
listings than for any other type of foreign listing. The average premium for U.S. exchange-listing firms 
three or more years before the listing is positive (0.07), but is small and is statistically insignificant. It 
increases to a statistically significant 0.59 in the year before listing. The premium for DR listings in 
London also increases to a comparably large 0.65 in the year before listing while those for Rule 144a 
private placements (0.23) and OTC listings (0.14) in the U.S. are smaller. There is no detectable premium 
for ordinary listings in London any time around the listing event. Third, the premium declines in the years 
following the listing event (although as noted earlier, this is expected). This is mostly consistent with the 
findings of Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, as well as indirectly with those of Sarkissian and Schill, except 
in the most critical dimension: the cross-listing premium for firms listing on major U.S. exchanges 
remains positive and statistically significant even beyond three years following the listing. Further, the F-
statistics indicate that the coefficients for “>3 years after listing” (0.21) and for “3 years after listing” 
(0.28) are significantly greater than the coefficients for “>3 years before listing” (0.07) and for “3 years 
before listing” (0.11). There is no permanent valuation increase for U.K. DR listings or for U.S. Rule 
144a private placements. Firms with U.S. OTC listings have a positive and significant coefficient for 
“>than 3 years after listing” (0.09), although this coefficient is significantly lower than the coefficient for 
“>3 years before listing” (0.13). In contrast to our results for U.S. exchange listings, Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler (Table 7) show that there is a Tobin’s q premium of -0.02 more than three years after 
internationalization for all internationalizing firms. 
In summary, we find that there is a pre-listing increase and a post-listing decline in valuations for 
cross-listing firms, in a way similar to related papers, but, unlike these other studies, we find that the 
premium persists permanently beyond three years following the listing on a U.S. exchange. Why are our   36
results so different from those of Sarkissian and Schill and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler? We can think 
of at least two different reasons. First, these studies employ different methodologies. It is difficult to 
compare our analysis to the long-run event-study analysis of Sarkissian and Schill. Second, the events 
under investigation are different. While the paper by Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler represents the 
analysis closest to our work in terms of methodology, they focus on a broad range of 
“internationalization” events. Their analysis does break down the valuation analysis into just exchange 
listings (which include U.S., U.K. and other markets) and just U.S. listings (including Rule 144a private 
placements and OTC listings) in their Table 7, but we have shown that the results are very different for 
U.S. exchange listings than for other types of U.S. listings and even for U.K. exchange listings. Our 
evidence is consistent with the theory presented in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004). With this theory, it 
is inappropriate to mix cross-listings on exchanges in different countries or to mix U.S. exchange listings 
with Rule 144a private placements or OTC listings because the governance constraints imposed by U.S. 
exchange listings are not imposed by other forms of listings. 
 
5.3. The cross-listing premium before and after 2001 
Has there been a decline in the valuation premium for U.S. exchange listings in the aftermath of the 
passage of the SOX Act in 2002? If U.S. capital markets have become less competitive in the market for 
foreign listings, even if we have not seen a change in the propensity to list in U.S. or U.K. markets or a 
change in the characteristics of the firms choosing to list in one market or the other, the net benefits for 
foreign firms from being listed on U.S. exchanges may still have declined. Our valuation analysis up to 
this point suggests that the valuation premium for U.S. exchange listed firms is permanent and is 
significant in all sample years. We did report, however, that, from 1990-2001, the average valuation 
premium was 17.5% compared to 14.3% from 2002-2005. Recent studies by Zingales (2006) and Litvak 
(2006) examining Tobin’s q and market-to-book valuation ratios also suggest that the premium may be   37
lower since 2002.
27 Zingales shows that the decline in the Tobin’s q valuation premium for cross-listed 
firms following the passage of SOX (his subperiods are 1997-2001 for pre-SOX versus 2003-2005 for 
post-SOX) is concentrated in firms from countries with better legal protections of minority shareholders 
(as measured by the average control premiums paid in large block transactions in various countries – see 
Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Similarly, Litvak (2006) shows that the largest declines in valuation premiums 
arise for firms with the highest pre-SOX disclosures. That is, the companies cross-listed in U.S. markets 
with higher quality corporate governance were the most adversely affected by the passage of SOX. 
We investigate whether the cross-listing premium changes after SOX in Table 11. We compute the 
valuation premiums for the firms that list on U.S. exchanges as in our panel regression from panel b of 
Table 9. We estimate the regressions with OLS and include with country and year dummy variables, as 
well as our usual set of firm-level control variables (sales growth, global industry q, log(sales)) – that is, 
we investigate whether the premium has declined post-SOX, after controlling for firm and country 
characteristics. We add a dummy variable for the passage of SOX for the U.S. exchange listings (“U.S. 
Exchange × Post SOX”). This dummy variable equals zero for exchange listings in the period from 1990 
to 2001 and one for the post-SOX period from 2002 to 2005. In model (1) we estimate the model with all 
non-financial firms with our usual data constraints related to Worldscope and $100 million or more in 
total assets, while in model (2) we further exclude U.K. cross-listings on U.S. exchanges. In both 
specifications, the coefficient for the U.S. exchange-listed valuation premium is statistically significant 
and large (0.25 and 0.23, respectively) as before, and the interactive coefficient on the post-SOX dummy 
variable is positive, but statistically insignificant.
28 These results suggest that SOX had no effect on the 
cross-listing premium for U.S. exchange listings, but it is legitimate to be concerned as to whether our 
findings result from an “averaging” effect since we include together firms from countries with better and 
                                                 
27 These two studies are distinct from the returns-based event-study papers of SOX and firm valuations by Berger, 
Li, and Wong (2005), Li (2006), Litvak (2007), and Smith (2006). The results vary across the various studies in 
terms of the implications of SOX, but this is not surprising given that they employ different event dates surrounding 
the passage of SOX, the announcement dates of delistings or other types of events and given that they utilize 
different sets of benchmark firms. 
28 If we exclude the year dummies, the coefficient for U.S. exchange × Post SOX becomes negative (between -0.02 
and -0.04), but is still statistically insignificant (t-statistic is between -0.47 and -1.20).   38
worse legal protections. Models (3) and (4) perform the same regressions as in models (1) and (2), but 
include an additional variable, “U.S. exchange × Post SOX × Low legal”, where Low legal is a dummy 
variable that equals one for countries with below-median scores on Legal and zero, otherwise. Based on 
Zingales (2006) and Litvak (2006), we would expect to see a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on this interactive dummy. We do not. In fact, the coefficient is negative, though statistically 
insignificant.
29 
We have failed to find evidence that is supportive of the hypothesis that the U.S. exchanges are losing 
their competitive edge in attracting foreign listings. Not only are we unable to discern any major changes 
in the flows of listings to the U.S. and U.K. markets (with a special recognition of the growth of the AIM 
market in the U.K.) that would be consistent with a loss of competitiveness, but also the characteristics of 
the firms pursuing these listings have changed very modestly and the valuation premiums typically 
ascribed to those listings continue. The governance benefits of listing on a U.S. exchange appear as 
important as they once were and have not diminished in recent years. In the next section, we pursue one 
more line of inquiry related to the governance benefit of U.S. listings beyond just the flow of listing 
activity, the characteristics of the cross-listing firms, and their valuations; namely, the capital raising 
activity around the listings. 
 
6. Capital raising activity around U.S. and U.K. cross-listings 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) and Reese and Weisbach (2002) argue 
that a useful way to test the effectiveness of a legal system and its ability to enforce any financial contract 
is to focus on the ease with which a firm can raise external capital. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny show that, in countries where legal protections are weak, it is considerably more difficult for 
                                                 
29 To be fair, we cannot really make direct comparisons with the Zingales (2006) and Litvak (2006) studies. Zingales 
uses the Dyck and Zingales (2004) control premiums (which are not available for all our countries) to score 
good/poor governance countries instead of our Legal variable. Moreover, rather than using using year-by-year 
country-level averages, our approach uses firm-level data and controls for firm and country characteristics. Litvak 
focuses on valuations in 2001 and 2002 and uses a matched-firm sample analysis for her benchmarking approach.   39
firms to raise external finance than for firms in countries that protect minority interests well. Coffee 
(1999) and Stulz (1999) point out that foreign firms that cross-list effectively borrow some of the legal 
protections of the U.S. regulatory environment bond themselves to protect the interests of their minority 
stockholders better. This is what we refer to as the governance benefit. Reese and Weisbach test, and 
provide evidence in support of, the bonding hypothesis by showing that foreign firms that cross-list on 
U.S. exchanges increase the number of equity issues after the listing, that the increase is larger for firms 
from countries with weak protections and, most interestingly, that the increase arises for equity issues in 
their home market as well as in the U.S. market, the original target market for the listings. In other words, 
the desire to protect shareholder rights appears to be such an important reason for why foreign firms 
cross-list in the U.S. that their doing so enhances their ability to raise capital not only in the U.S., but at 
home and elsewhere. Since we fail to find evidence that U.K. listings have a governance benefit, we 
would expect that firms that list on U.S. exchanges raise more equity after listing, but firms that list on the 
Main Market in the U.K. do not. 
In this section, we extend the experiment of Reese and Weisbach (2002) and measure the extent of 
equity issuance activity of firms listing on U.S. exchanges and firms listing on the Main Market in the 
U.K. in the years before and after their listing over the period of analysis from 1990 to 2005. We examine 
whether they raise equity in the U.S. or U.K. markets, in their home market, or in other markets. To the 
best of our knowledge, no study has yet examined the consequences of a foreign listing in the U.K. for 
capital raising activity at home or outside the U.K. If the governance gain is exclusively attributable to 
U.S. exchange listings, then we would expect no major changes in equity issuance activity for those firms 
following their listing in the U.K. markets. 
Information about the capital raising activity for our foreign firms comes from a number of data 
sources, including Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and the London Stock Exchange. SDC contains the 
date of issue, the market (country) in which the security was issued, and the proceeds from each issue. We 
compare the issuance dates from SDC with the cross-listing dates drawn from the sources described   40
above in order to determine whether they took place up to three years before or within three years after 
the listing (therefore we consider new cross-listings from 1993-2002). We apply the usual screens to 
focus our analysis on non-financial, non-U.S., and non-U.K. firms with available data in the Worldscope 
database and with total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. For U.K. listings, 
the SDC data is supplemented with international issuance data directly from the London Stock Exchange. 
These data include the issuance date, the issue type, sector, price, the proceeds of the issue, and the 
underwriter name and its country of origin.
30 Unfortunately, the LSE data begins only in 1998. To ensure 
that we do not exclude any relevant capital raising activity on the Main Market in the U.K., we include 
both DRs and ordinary listings in our analysis. 
Table 12 presents the results. We report the issuance activity by market location including the number 
of capital raising events and the dollar amount both before and after a cross-listing and separately for U.S. 
exchange listings and Main Market listings in the U.K. Overall, we identify 61 (12%) of the 530 firms 
with U.S. cross-listings with equity issues before the listing and 157 (30%) with issues after the listing. 
Among the 119 U.K. cross-listing firms, 7 (6%) have equity issues before the listing and 30 (25%) 
afterward. The increase in the number of issues around the listing events is similar in the two cross-listing 
markets. However, the dollar magnitudes are not. Total equity raised among the U.S. cross-listing firms 
increases from $29 billion to $151 billion over the listing period – a statistically significant difference for 
the mean listing firm – while that for the U.K. cross-listing firms increased modestly from $8 billion to 
almost $13 billion. 
Another important result in this table is that there is a significant increase in the dollar magnitude of 
equity issuance around U.S. cross-listings not just in the U.S. markets (which represents a statistically 
significant increase from $3 billion to $17 billion), but also in the home markets ($15 billion to $79 
                                                 
30 The authors are grateful to Matthew Leighton in the Market Information and Analysis division of the London 
Stock Exchange for his help and for supplying the data. We performed extensive cross-checking of the SDC and 
LSE information and always supplemented SDC in favor of the LSE data when in doubt. We also evaluated how 
much our Worldscope, sector, and asset-size constraints are binding on the size of the issuance sample of firms and 
how much they issue.   41
billion) and other markets ($10 billion to $55 billion). Each of these increases is statistically significant 
for the mean firm. This result can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with that of Reese and 
Weisbach (2002). Though they only examine post-listing equity issuances, they find that firms from 
countries with poor legal protections in the home market raise a higher fraction of capital in their home 
markets and in other markets than firms from countries with good legal protections. We find no similar 
changes around U.K. exchange-listings. There is an increase in equity issuances in the home market (from 
$5 billion to $7 billion), in other markets ($2 billion to $5 billion) and certainly in the target U.K. market 
(up to $1 billion), but none of these changes are statistically significant. 
One possible problem we face with this analysis is that some firms from around the world cross-list 
on both London and New York. If a firm cross-lists in London after having already listed on a U.S. 
exchange, the firm may not realize any incremental governance gain as a result or, worse, it may appear 
to do so, but it would be falsely associated with a London listing (especially if the two listing events occur 
close in calendar time). To address this potential problem, we repeat the analysis, but exclude all firms 
with exchange listings in both London and New York. The number of firms is much smaller, especially 
for London, but our inferences are very similar to those above. 
These results reaffirm the role of a governance gain for foreign firms listing on U.S. exchanges. Firms 
that list on U.S. exchanges increase their equity issuance activity following the listing, at home, and in 
other markets in ways that firms that pursue listings in the U.K. do not. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cross-listings in the U.S. and the U.K. over time. We 
find that the number of cross-listed firms in the U.S. and on the LSE’s Main Market in London follows a 
similar pattern, increasing from 1990 to 1999, with a peak around the turn of the century, and then a 
steady decline thereafter. The fact is that listing counts have been falling in London as well as in New 
York. This broader phenomenon makes it difficult to explain the decrease in New York alone using an   42
argument that New York is becoming less competitive, perhaps because of SOX and other regulatory 
changes. It is true that the number of listings on AIM in London has been growing dramatically since 
2001, but most firms that list on AIM are small firms that would have been unlikely candidates to cross-
list on the U.S. exchanges. 
The argument that the U.S. exchanges have become less competitive only makes sense if some firms 
that would have listed in New York in the 1990s would no longer do so. We investigate this proposition 
and find no support for it. The characteristics of listing firms have not significantly changed since the 
adoption of SOX. There is little evidence that firms have been making listing decisions differently in 
recent years from how they made them from 1990 to 2001. If anything has changed in the aftermath of 
SOX, it is that the non-listed firms have become smaller and are therefore less likely to list on the U.S. 
exchanges or the Main Market in London. The changing composition of firms that are not listed implies 
that there were actually more listed firms than one would expect based on the listing decision patterns 
from 1990 to 2001. 
To ascertain further whether the benefits and costs of listing on the U.S. exchanges have changed 
over time, we conduct the most complete analysis of the relative valuation of U.S. listed firms to date. We 
use several distinct approaches to measure the cross-listing premium: cross-sectional regressions, Fama-
MacBeth regressions, pooled regressions with firm fixed-effects, and event-time regressions. With each 
approach, we find that there is a listing premium for firms that list on U.S. exchanges but that there is no 
listing premium for firms that list in London. The listing premium is also extremely robust: it exists every 
year and it is permanent in event time. We find no evidence that the listing premium falls after 2001, even 
for listed firms from countries with good investor protection. 
All of our evidence is consistent with the theory that there is a distinct governance benefit for firms 
that list on the U.S. exchanges. This benefit is not shared by firms that list in the U.S. outside the 
exchanges or in London. There is no evidence in our data that this benefit has weakened over time.   43
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Figure 1. The distribution of foreign listings in 1998 and 2005. 
This figure shows the number of foreign listings in various host markets in 1998 and 2005. The data are from 
the World Federation of Stock Exchanges (www.world-exchanges.org). The Federation reports data for major 
exchanges, for markets specifically designed for small and medium sized enterprises, and other markets. 
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Figure 2. The U.S. cross-listing premium, 1990 to 2005. 
This figure shows average q of non-cross-listed firms each year, as well as the premium for U.S. exchange-listings. The premiums are the estimated coefficients 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the total number of cross-listings each year. 
This Table shows the total number of firms cross-listed in either the U.S. or the U.K., each year from 1990-2005. The Table includes all cross-listings in the U.S. 
and the U.K. in a given year. Information on cross-listings comes from the Bank of New York, Citibank, JP Morgan, the NYSE, NASDAQ, the LSE, the Pink 
Sheets, CRSP, firms’ annual reports, 20-Fs, and Factiva searches. Firms can cross-list in the U.S. via Rule 144a, over-the-counter as OTCBB or Pink Sheet 
issues, or on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. Firms can cross-list in the U.K. via the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), or on the Main Market via 
depositary receipts or an ordinary listing. 
  U.S. cross-listings    U.K. cross-listings 
Year  Rule 144a  OTC  Exchange    AIM  Depositary receipts  Ordinary listings 
1990 15  139 328    0  3  333 
1991 21  180 343    0  3  350 
1992 35  226 387    0  3  361 
1993 57  281 460    0  3  367 
1994  144 380 538    0  9  378 
1995  172 449 606    2  27  394 
1996  221 510 722    10  52  418 
1997  261 570 809    12  76  415 
1998  281 632 851    18  98  391 
1999  297 730 876    20  111 372 
2000  296 764 960    29  122 363 
2001  285 938 950    44  117 327 
2002  283 993 902    55  115 291 
2003  297 895 881    70  110 265 
2004  298 901 883    131 108 241 
2005  312 909 866    242 111 216 
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Table 2. New cross-listings and delistings: 1990 to 2005. 
This Table shows the total number of new cross-listings and delistings, in either the U.S. or the U.K., each year from 1990 to 2005. The Table includes all cross-
listings in the U.S. and the U.K. in a given year. Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. Firms can cross-list in the 
U.S. via Rule 144a, over-the-counter as OTCBB or Pink Sheet issues, or on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. Firms can cross-list in the U.K. via the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), or on the Main Market via depositary receipts or an ordinary listing. All delistings are included in the counts, regardless of the reason 
for delisting. If a firm upgrades from a Rule 144a or OTC listing to a U.S. exchange listing, the upgrade is counted as a new U.S. exchange listing and as a 
delisting from the Rule 144a or OTC market. 
  U.S. cross-listings    U.K. cross-listings 
  Rule 144a  OTC  Exchange    AIM  Depositary receipts  Ordinary listings 
Year  New listings  Delistings  New listings  Delistings  New listings  Delistings    New listings  Delistings  New listings  Delistings  New listings Delistings 
1990  15 6 40  29  32 9    0  0  0  0 29 0 
1991  13 6 47 6 31  17    0  0  0  0 17 0 
1992  17 1 47 1 54  10    0  0  0  0 11 0 
1993  27 3 63 3 90  17    0  0  0  0  8  2 
1994  97  6 107 6 103  26    0  0  6  0  11  0 
1995  35 6 79 8 94  29    2  0 18 0 17 1 
1996  58 7 79  16  142  25    8  0 25 0 26 2 
1997  45 4 97  33  129  41    5  3 24 0 12  18 
1998  29 8 76  14  95  55    6  0 22 0 10  34 
1999  28  11 122 22  91  65    4  2  14  1  15  39 
2000  18  17  52  18  164  81    11 2 13 2 22  32 
2001  9  20 205 31  70  81    16  1  3  8  10  51 
2002  7  9  70  14  46  94  12  1  3  5  3  40 
2003  20 6 69  166  38  58    18 3  1  6  5 37 
2004  20 18 46 35 62 52    62  1  3  5  6  33 
2005  25 11 45 34 58 66    114 2  11  8  4  28 
                 
Total  463  139 1244 436 1299 726  0 258  15  143  35  206  317 
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Table 3. New cross-listings by country: 1990 to 2005. 
This Table shows the total number of new cross-listings, in either the U.S. or the U.K., by country over the 
period from 1990 to 2005. The table includes all cross-listings in the U.S. and the U.K. in a given year. 
Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. Firms can cross-list in the 
U.S. via Rule 144a, over-the-counter as OTCBB or Pink Sheet issues, or on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. 
Firms can cross-list in the U.K. via the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), or on the Main Market via 
depositary receipts or an ordinary listing. 
  U.S. cross-listings    U.K. cross-listings 




Argentina 11  8 18 0 1  0
Australia 7  105  33    49  0  2 
Austria  2 20 1    0  0  0 
Bahamas  0 0 4    0 0 0 
Bahrain  0 0 0    0 1 0 
Bangladesh  0 0 0    1 0 0 
Barbados  0 0 0    1 0 0 
Belgium  2 2 5    1 0 1 
Belize  0 0 1    3 0 0 
Bermuda  1  6 43    25 0 21 
Bolivia  0 5 0    0 0 0 
Brazil 13  48  38    0  1  0 
British Virgin Islands  0  0  13    12  0  1 
Canada 0  319  399    40  0  7 
Cayman  Islands  2  0 24    14 0 18 
Chile  4 2  25    0 1 0 
China 7  22  24    1  2  3 
Colombia  6 4 1    0 0 0 
Croatia  3 0 0    0 2 0 
Cyprus  0 0 0    4 1 0 
Czech  Republic  3 1 0    0 3 0 
Denmark  2 1 5    1 0 0 
Dominican  Republic 0 1 1    0 0 0 
Ecuador  2 2 0    0 0 0 
Egypt  10 3  0    0 11 0 
Estonia  2 0 0    0 1 0 
Falkland  Islands  0 0 0    2 0 0 
Finland  5 4 8    0 0 1 
France 10  20  39    1  0  3 
Germany 6  32  33    3  0  4 
Ghana  1 0 1    0 0 1 
Gibraltar  0 0 0    1 0 2 
Greece  4 6 9    0 7 2 
Hong Kong  2  118  34    1  0  0 
Hungary  6 3 1    0 4 0 
India  79 1 14    1 25 0 
Indonesia  3 4 4    0 2 0 
Ireland  0 13  20    37 0 58 
Israel  2 14  108    16 3  7 
Italy 13  4  16    3  0  0 
Jamaica  0 4 0    0 0 0 
Japan  6 32  19    0  0 17 
Jersey  0 0 1    0 0 0 
Jordan  1 0 0    0 2 0 
Kazakhstan  3 1 0    0 1 0   51
 
Table 3, continued. 
  U.S. cross-listings    U.K. cross-listings 




Latvia 1  0 0 0 1  0
Lebanon 3  0  0    0  2  0 
Lithuania 2  0  0    0  1  0 
Luxembourg 2  2  15    4  1  6 
Malawi 0  0  0    0  1  0 
Malaysia 0  14  0    1  0  0 
Malta 1  0  0    0  1  0 
Marshall Islands  0  0  2    0  0  0 
Mauritius 0  0  0    0  0  4 
Mexico 31  49  39    0  0  0 
Morocco 1  0  0    0  0  1 
Netherlands Antilles  0  0  1    0  0  3 
Netherlands 3  16  44    1  1  7 
New Zealand  0  3  10    1  0  0 
Nigeria 1  0  0    0  0  0 
Norway 5  9  10    1  0  3 
Oman 1  0  0    0  1  0 
Panama 0  2  3    0  0  0 
Papua New Guinea  0  2  0    0  1  0 
Pakistan 3  0  0    0  0  0 
Peru 3  4  4    0  0  0 
Philippines 7  6  1    0  0  0 
Poland 12  3  1    0  13  0 
Portugal 4  4  4    0  0  1 
Puerto Rico  0  0  3    0  0  0 
Qatar 1  0  0    0  1  0 
Romania 1  0  0    0  1  0 
Russia 12  56  6    0  7  0 
Singapore 2  24  10    1  0  0 
Slovakia 0  1  0    0  0  0 
Slovenia 2  0  0    0  2  0 
South Africa  10  46  14    0  2  7 
South Korea  29  5  15    0  14  0 
Spain 3  5  4    0  0  0 
Sri Lanka  1  0  0    0  0  0 
Sweden 4  11  13    1  0  3 
Switzerland 3  12  16    0  0  5 
Taiwan 56  0  9    0  14  0 
Thailand 2  15  0    0  0  0 
Trinidad 0  1  0    0  0  0 
Tunisia 1  0  0    0  1  0 
Turkey 16  7  1    0  9  0 
United Emirates  0  0  0    0  1  0 
United Kingdom  17  122  129    0  0  0 
Ukraine 0  9  0    0  0  0 
Uruguay 1  0  0    0  0  0 
United States  0  0  0    31  0  17 
Venezuela 3  11  3    0  0  0 
Zimbabwe 1  0  0    0  0  1   52
Table 4. The type and frequency of delistings: 1990 to 2005. 
This Table shows the number of delistings from U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, or the NYSE) and from the ordinary listings on the Main Market in 
the U.K. over the period from 1990 to 2005. Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. A delisting is classified as 
“Voluntary” if a firm is in compliance with an exchange’s listing standards and voluntarily takes steps to delist its shares or depositary receipts. Firms are also 
delisted when they are acquired and these cases are classified as “Merger / acquisition”. Finally, firms are delisted for other reasons, most often by the exchanges 
when they fail to meet listing standards, when a firm is bankrupt, in financial distress, or undergoes restructuring. The first number for each category is the 
number of delistings of that type. The second number is the number of delistings as a % of the total number of listings that year. 
  U.S. exchange delistings    U.K. ordinary delistings 
Year Voluntary  Merger/acquisition  Other    Voluntary  Merger/acquisition  Other 
1990  1 0.30% 2  0.61%  6  1.83%    0 0.00% 0  0.00% 0  0.00% 
1991  1 0.29% 3  0.87% 13  3.79%    0 0.00% 0  0.00% 0  0.00% 
1992  0 0.00% 2  0.52%  8  2.07%    0 0.00% 0  0.00% 0  0.00% 
1993  1 0.22% 7  1.52%  9  1.96%    1 0.27% 1  0.27% 0  0.00% 
1994  1 0.19% 7  1.30% 18  3.35%    0 0.00% 0  0.00% 0  0.00% 
1995  0 0.00%  17  2.81% 12  1.98%    0 0.00% 1  0.24% 0  0.00% 
1996  1 0.14%  14  1.94% 10  1.39%    1 0.21% 0  0.00% 1  0.21% 
1997  3 0.37%  17  2.10% 21  2.60%    3 0.61% 8  1.63% 7  1.43% 
1998  4 0.47%  31  3.64% 20  2.35%    5 1.02%  22 4.50% 7  1.43% 
1999  0 0.00%  32  3.65% 32  3.65%    3 0.62%  25 5.18%  11  2.28% 
2000  6 0.63%  39  4.06% 36  3.75%    5 1.03%  20 4.12% 7  1.44% 
2001  5  0.53% 42  4.42%  34  3.58%    12 2.70% 26  5.86% 13  2.93% 
2002  19 2.11% 24  2.66%  51  5.65%    18 4.43%  7  1.72% 15  3.69% 
2003  17 1.93% 22  2.50%  19  2.16%    24 6.40% 10  2.67%  3 0.80% 
2004  15 1.70% 17  1.93%  20  2.27%    18 5.16%  7  2.01%  8 2.29% 
2005  21 2.42% 33  3.81%  13  1.50%    15 4.59%  8  2.45%  5 1.53% 
              
Total 95  309  322    105  135  77   53
Table 5. Characteristics of newly cross-listed firms. 
This Table compares the characteristics of firms with new cross-listings in a given year and firms that are not cross-listed over the period from 1990 to 2005. 
Firms can cross-list in the U.S. via Rule 144a, over-the-counter as OTCBB or Pink Sheet issues, or on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE. Firms can cross-list in 
the U.K. via the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), or on the Main Market via depositary receipts or an ordinary listing. Information on cross-listings comes 
from a variety of sources described in Table 1. In panels a and b, the sample includes all new cross-listings by non-U.S. firms that are in the Worldscope database 
in a given year. In panels c and d, the sample includes all new cross-listings by non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database and 
have total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. The median value for a 
given characteristic is computed for firms with new cross-listings. For firms that are not cross-listed, the median is computed over all firm-year observations. For 
the common law dummy, the percentage of firms with new cross-listings from common law countries is reported. Tobin’s q is computed as ((Total Assets – 
Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency). Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized 
at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, total assets is in $ millions, adjusted for inflation, leverage is defined as total debt divided 
by total assets, and ownership is the data item “closely-held shares” from Worldscope. Common law is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s legal 
origin is based on common law. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2006) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) and stock 
market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. The tests at the bottom of each panel report p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, 
which test the hypothesis that two samples are from populations with the same distribution. In panels a and c, the characteristics of firms with new U.S. exchange 
listings are compared to the characteristics of firms with other new cross-listing types and with firms that are not cross-listed. In panels b and d, the 
characteristics of new cross-listings and firms that are not cross-listed are compared before and after SOX (the period from 1990 to 2001 vs. 2002 to 2005). 
Panel a.  q Sales  growth  Global  
industry q  Total assets  Leverage  Ownership    Common 
Law 
Anti-





  N  Median N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median    Percent  Median  Median  Median  Median 
1990  –  2005                       
U.S.  Rule  144a  276  1.35 193 0.12 303 1.19 303  994.54  303 0.23 185 0.43   26  3.0 20.9  4635  0.40 
U.S.  OTC  858  1.25 636 0.08 937 1.16 937  275.4  935 0.19 616 0.40   68  4.0 40.0  21000  0.99 
U.S.  Exchange 751  1.56 497 0.15 822 1.27 822  654.6  821 0.19 493 0.38   55  4.0 40.0  20250  0.80 
U.K.  AIM  80  2.01 32 0.10 84 1.43 84 11.5 83 0.00 63 0.35   96  4.0 40.0  22890  1.04 
U.K.  DR  89  1.35 54 0.14 92 1.15 92  1290.0  91 0.17 55 0.55   23  3.0 18.7  4210  0.33 
U.K.  Ordinary  93  1.34  76  0.14 105 1.16 105  689.5  105 0.15  88  0.41   57  4.0 31.2  21730  0.67 
Not  listed  194061  1.10 174404 0.03 219975 1.12 219843  113.8  218936 0.20 155296 0.50   40  3.5  31.4  20470  0.71 
                        
Rule  144a  vs.  Exchange 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
OTC  vs.  Exchange  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.43  0.98    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.95  0.00 
AIM  vs.  Exchange  0.02  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.52    0.00  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00 
DR  vs.  Exchange  0.00  0.65  0.00  0.00  0.87  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ordinary  vs.  Exchange  0.01  0.64  0.00  0.74  0.35  0.71    0.74  0.03  0.00  0.09  0.06 
Not  listed  vs.  Exchange 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04   54




q Sales  growth  Global  
industry q  Total assets  Leverage  Ownership    Common 
Law 
Anti-





  N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median    Percent  Median  Median  Median  Median 
1990  –  2001                       
U.S.  Rule  144a 215 1.37 149 0.10 252 1.22 252  999.4  252 0.22 139 0.47   25  3.0 20.9  4430 0.56 
U.S.  OTC  690 1.23 493 0.08 747 1.16 747  341.7  746 0.20 485 0.40   69  4.0 40.0  20560  0.99 
U.S.  Exchange  609 1.53 414 0.16 674 1.28 674  729.6  673 0.21 383 0.39   52  4.0 40.0  24560  1.04 
U.K.  AIM  16 2.32  4 -0.04 16 1.15 16 6.39 16 0.04 16 0.45   94  4.0 40.0  20030  0.81 
U.K.  DR  81 1.38 47 0.12 84 1.18 84  1290.0  83 0.17 52 0.55   22  3.0 18.7  4260  0.32 
U.K.  Ordinary  85 1.33 69 0.14 96 1.16 96  701.2  96 0.16 80 0.43   54  4.0 31.2  21370  0.67 
Not  listed  123581 1.11 107121 0.03 143111 1.13 142999  138.72  142223 0.21 104875 0.50   40.2  3.5  31.4  20110  0.67 
                       
2002  –  2005                       
U.S.  Rule  144a 51 1.32 44 0.20 51 1.08 51  999.4  51 0.29 46 0.40   33  3.0 20.9  13736  0.36 
U.S.  OTC  168 1.42 143 0.06 190 1.16 190  81.25  189 0.15 131 0.46   65  4.0 40.0  24560  1.04 
U.S.  Exchange  142 1.77  83  0.11 148 1.25 148  215.4  148 0.08 110 0.34   71  4.0 35.0  20000  0.77 
U.K.  AIM  64 1.94 28 0.17 68 1.52 68  12.16  67 0.00 47 0.32   97  4.0 40.0  25700  1.20 
U.K.  DR  8 1.16 7 0.18 8 1.04 8  2463.4  8 0.27 3 0.43    38  4.0  19.1  1990  0.55 
U.K.  Ordinary  8 2.15 7 0.15 9 1.28 9  689.5  9 0.13 8 0.27    63  4.0  35.7  24560  0.84 
Not  listed  70480 1.08 67283 0.04 76864 1.10 76844  79.49  76713 0.19 76713 0.49   59.8  3.5  31.4 24560 0.80 
                       
Rule 144a: pre / post SOX  0.51    0.00    0.00    0.74    0.19    0.46    0.23  0.09  0.38  0.82  0.00 
OTC:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.00  0.05  0.64  0.00  0.02  0.04    0.43  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.06 
Exchange:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.17    0.02  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.37    0.00  0.27  0.01  0.00  0.00 
AIM:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.27  0.69  0.00  0.14  0.25  0.33    0.52  0.56  0.31  0.00  0.00 
DR:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.62  0.29  0.01  0.78  0.66  0.74    0.38  0.12  0.94  0.21  0.37 
Ordinary:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.22  0.69  0.24  0.87  0.98  0.27    0.73  0.42  0.03  0.26  0.55 
Not listed: pre / post SOX  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   55
Table 5, continued. 
Panel c.  q Sales  growth  Global  
industry q  Total assets  Leverage  Ownership    Common 
Law 
Anti-





  N  Median N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median    Percent  Median  Median  Median  Median 
1990  –  2005                       
U.S.  Rule  144a  93  1.35 93 0.14 93 1.21 93  1255.7  93 0.29 93 0.39   23  3.5 23.1  12070  0.55 
U.S.  OTC  270  1.25 270 0.08 270 1.20 270  1113.9  270 0.23 270 0.45   47  4.0 31.4  21530  0.67 
U.S.  Exchange 207  1.44 207 0.13 207 1.24 207  2132.9  207 0.23 207 0.40   32  3.5 31.4  22100  0.67 
U.K.  AIM  5  1.33 5 0.18 5 1.48 5  146.0  5 0.29 5 0.15    100 4.0  40.0  23610  1.04 
U.K.  DR  22  1.41 22 0.16 22 1.15 22  1425.3  22 0.29 22 0.51   25  3.5 18.7  7355  0.35 
U.K.  Ordinary 38  1.47 38 0.14 38 1.23 38  2954.3  38 0.23 38 0.45   36  3.5 31.2  24515  0.88 
Not  listed  57421  1.13 57421 0.03 57421 1.15 57421  391.3  57421 0.26 57421 0.49   30  3.5  31.4 26960 0.67 
                        
Rule  144a  vs.  Exchange 0.05  0.95  0.00  0.05  0.15  0.74    0.12  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.01 
OTC  vs.  Exchange  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.03    0.00  0.00  0.21  0.09  0.98 
AIM  vs.  Exchange  0.97  0.97  0.81  0.00  0.77  0.02    0.00  0.09  0.00  0.50  0.09 
DR  vs.  Exchange  0.30  0.83  0.07  0.15  0.50  0.13    0.54  0.79  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ordinary  vs.  Exchange  0.61  0.88  0.81  0.76  0.76  0.35    0.56  0.40  0.08  0.85  0.51 
Not  listed  vs.  Exchange 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.36 
 
   56




q Sales  growth  Global  
industry q  Total assets  Leverage  Ownership    Common 
Law 
Anti-





  N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median N Median    Percent  Median  Median  Median  Median 
1990  –  2001                       
U.S.  Rule  144a 60 1.35 60 0.10 60 1.25 60  1387.9  60 0.22 60 0.43   22  3.5  22.41  11355  0.35 
U.S.  OTC  214 1.23 214 0.09 214 1.21 214  1359.8  214 0.25 214 0.44   51  4.0 31.6  21530  0.67 
U.S.  Exchange  165 1.44 165 0.13 165 1.25 165  2456.7  165 0.24 165 0.40   28  3.5 31.2  21810  0.67 
U.K.  AIM  1 1.20 1 0.95 1 0.91 1  111.37  1 0.29 1 0.04    100 4.0  40.0  22100  0.99 
U.K.  DR  20 1.34 20 0.16 20 1.15 20  1651.9  20 0.25 20 0.52   15  3.5 18.7  9900  0.35 
U.K.  Ordinary  34 1.43  3  0.11 33 1.25 34  2954.3  34 0.22 34 0.44   33  3.5 31.2  23875  0.88 
Not  listed  39636 1.15 39636 0.03 39636 1.18 39636  411.5  39636 0.27 39636 0.50   30  3.5  31.4 27730 0.66 
                       
2002  –  2005                       
U.S.  Rule  144a 33 1.33 33 0.23 33 1.12 33  603.9  33 0.32 33 0.38   24  3.0 25.6  13476  0.99 
U.S.  OTC  56 1.33 56 0.08 56 1.14 56  736.4  56 0.19 56 0.51   31  3.5 30.0  23750  0.67 
U.S.  Exchange  42 1.53 42 0.12 42 1.16 42  1376.4  42 0.21 42 0.43   48  4.0 31.5  22660  0.79 
U.K.  AIM  4 1.62 4 0.00 4 1.59 4  217.58  4 0.24 4 0.16    100 4.0  40.0  24560  1.12 
U.K.  DR  2 1.59 2 0.45 2 1.08 2  398.5  2 0.33 2 0.39    100 5.0  20.9  620  0.56 
U.K.  Ordinary  4 2.65 4 0.23 4 1.22 4  3030.9  4 0.29 4 0.51    25 3.75  35.7  28345  0.79 
Not  listed  17785 1.10 17785 0.04 17785 1.12 17785  350.9  17785 0.24 17785 0.48   22  3.5  31.4 24330 0.76 
                       
Rule 144a: pre / post SOX  0.97    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.10    0.50    1.00  0.78  0.25  0.37  0.00 
OTC:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.68  0.43  0.01  0.06  0.06  0.05    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.47  0.91 
Exchange:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.51  0.68  0.50  0.03  0.06  0.72    0.02  0.21  0.68  0.50  0.35 
AIM:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.48  0.16  0.16  0.48  1.00  0.48    1.00  1.00  1.00  0.18  0.48 
DR:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.57  0.49  0.30  0.17  0.65  0.36    0.04  0.06  0.41  0.11  0.25 
Ordinary:  pre  /  post  SOX  0.10  0.32  0.89  0.48  0.49  0.96    0.61  0.88  0.21  0.81  0.83 
Not listed: pre / post SOX  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   57
 
Table 6. Competing risks models of the determinants of the listing decision. 
The Cox proportional hazard models estimate the probability of listing in the U.S. or in the U.K. in year t, given that the firm does not yet have a listing of that 
type, over the period from 1991 to 2005. The sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total 
assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. Information on cross-listings comes 
from a variety of sources described in Table 1. Models (1) and (2) include all types of listings in New York and London, while Models (3) and (4) include only 
exchange listings in New York and ordinary listings in London. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global 
industry q is the median global industry q, total assets is in $ millions, adjusted for inflation, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, and 
ownership is the data item “closely-held shares” from Worldscope. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2006) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log 
of GNP per capita ($) and stock market capitalization to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The 
hazard ratios for U.S. exchange listings and U.K. ordinary listings are estimated jointly, but are allowed to vary across outcomes and the baseline hazard for each 
listing choice is assumed to be different. The model does not estimate a constant. The Table reports hazard ratios (i.e., exp(βx), not βx). The t-statistics test the 
null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one. The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed assuming observations are 
independent across firms, but not across time. The column, “Test” tests whether the hazard ratios for U.S. listings are different from U.K. listings. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  All listing types in the U.S. and U.K.    U.S. exchange listings and U.K. ordinary listings 


































*** -(0.53)     (7.18)
*** (2.58)
**  (4.85)
*** -(0.34)   






















Leverage  0.46 1.00 0.82 0.32 1.32 1.88    0.38 0.94 0.59 0.15 1.29 2.40 
 -(3.36)
*** (0.00)    -(4.23)
*** (0.27)      -(2.90)
*** -(0.05)    -(4.65)
*** -(0.19)   
Ownership      0.35  0.68  0.76        0.20  1.12  4.70
** 
       -(4.38)
***  -(0.53)         -(4.07)
*** (0.17)   
Legal  4.23 2.57 1.16 4.49 3.32 0.34    5.51 2.04 2.26 5.45 2.98 0.77 
 (11.2)
*** (2.09)
 **  (9.98)
*** (2.35)
***     (8.21)
*** (1.18)    (6.64)
*** (1.68)
*  
Log  (GNP)  0.84 0.91 0.21 0.84 0.92 0.26    1.04 0.93 0.41 1.04 0.85 0.73 
 -(3.93)
 *** -(0.64)    -(3.21)
***  -(0.46)    (0.59)  -(0.36)  (0.45)  -(0.74)  
Stock market cap / GDP  0.73  0.65  0.14 0.74 0.59 0.30    0.56 1.02 2.96
* 0.51 0.86 1.33 
 -(3.34)
*** -(1.40)    -(2.99)
*** -(1.37)     -(2.99)
*** (0.07)    -(2.41)
** -(0.43)   
Number  of  failures  573  39   425  30     266  24   183  20  
Number of observations  145,061  118,109    136,059  110,583 
Log likelihood  -6050.18  -4367.82  -2731.71  -1849.64 
χ2 760.71  593.13    615.48  483.49 
Prob > χ2 0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000   58
Table 7. Logit regressions of the characteristics of exchange-listed firms. 
This Table analyzes the characteristics of firms that cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange (Amex, NASDAQ, or the NYSE) and on the LSE (ordinary listings) over 
the period from 1990 to 2005. The sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total assets of at 
least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. Information on cross-listings comes from a 
variety of sources described in Table 1. Firms with other types of cross-listings (Rule 144a or OTC in the U.S. and AIM or depositary receipts in the U.K.) are 
excluded. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, total 
assets is in $ millions, adjusted for inflation, leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, and ownership is the data item “closely-held shares” from 
Worldscope. Legal is anti-director × rule of law, from Djankov et al. (2006) and La Porta et al. (1998). Log of GNP per capita ($) and stock market capitalization 
to GDP are from the World Bank WDI Database. Each year from 1990 to 2005, a logit regression is estimated, where the dependent variable equals one if a firm 
is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange (models 1-4) or on the LSE via an ordinary listing (models 5-8). The Table reports the average coefficients of the 16 logit 
regressions (one for each year over 1990-2005). This Table also analyzes firms’ decisions to cross-list over the period from 1990 to 2001 (pre-SOX) and then 
from 2002 to 2005 (post-SOX). The t-statistics, in parentheses, are calculated using the Fama-Macbeth approach from the time series of estimated logit 
coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation (one lag). Pseudo-R
2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted 
likelihood functions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  U.S. exchange listings    U.K. ordinary listings 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
1990 – 2001 
(4) 
2002 – 2005   (5)  (6)  (7) 
1990 – 2001 
(8) 
2002 – 2005 

















** -(1.61)  -(1.74) 






























Ownership    -2.46 -2.48 -2.40      -3.68 -3.86  -3.14 
   -(17.95)
*** -(13.87)
*** -(21.65)
































Number of observations  81,161  65,016 45,176 19,840    78,297 63,159 44,315  18,844 
Average Pseudo R
2  0.2290 0.2870 0.2908 0.2753   0.2529  0.2978  0.3092  0.2596 
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Table 8. The propensity to cross-list on major exchanges over time. 
This Table examines whether the propensity to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange (Amex, NASDAQ, or the NYSE) and on the LSE (ordinary listings) has 
declined since 2001. The sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total assets of at least $100 
million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of 
sources described in Table 1. Firms with other types of cross-listings (Rule 144a or OTC in the U.S. and AIM or depositary receipts in the U.K.) are excluded. 
Each year from 1990 to 2001, a logit regression is estimated, where the dependent variable equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange (Panel a) or on 
the LSE via an ordinary listing (Panel b). In model (1), the explanatory variables are sales growth, global industry q, log of total assets, leverage, and ownership. 
In model (2), the explanatory variables are legal, log of GNP, and stock market capitalization to GDP. Model (3) includes all explanatory variables. “Firms” is 
the number of firms in the sample for a given year. “Listed” is the number of firms with a cross-listing in a given year. “Actual %” is the percent of firms with a 
cross-listing. “Expected %” is computed by applying the average logit coefficients for 1990 to 2001 (Table 7) to the values of the explanatory variables for each 
firm each year between 2002 and 2005, obtaining the predicted probability that a firm has a listing each year, summing the predicted probabilities over firms each 
year, dividing by the number of firms, and multiplying by 100. 
Panel a. U.S. exchange listings 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Year Firms  Listed  Actual  % 












1990 – 2001 (average)  3,765  170  4.52               
2002 4,738  343  7.24    3.09 -4.15    3.57 -3.67    2.43 -4.81 
2003 4,939  322  6.52    3.72 -2.80    3.04 -3.48    2.64 -3.88 
2004 5,189  347  6.67    4.90 -1.77    2.77 -3.90    3.33 -3.34 
2005 4,974  344  6.92    5.69 -1.23    2.78 -4.14    3.95 -2.96 
Panel b. U.K. ordinary listings 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Year Firms  Listed  Actual  % 












1990 – 2001 (average)  3,693  99  2.68               
2002 4,494  99  2.20    2.01 -0.19    3.09 0.89    1.79 -0.41 
2003 4,708  91  1.93    2.42 0.49    2.97 1.04    2.14 0.21 
2004 4,934  91  1.84    3.02 1.18    2.76 0.92    2.46 0.62 
2005 4,708  78  1.66    3.39 1.73    2.78 1.12    2.75 1.09 
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Table 9. Regression analysis of the valuation of cross-listed firms: 1990 to 2005. 
Panel a presents the cross-sectional regression estimates of the valuation differential of cross-listing in the U.S. or in the U.K, each year from 1990 to 2005. The 
sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in 
a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. The 
dependent variable in each regression is Tobin’s q, computed as ((Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local 
currency). U.S. Rule 144a, U.S. OTC, U.S. Exchange, U.K. AIM, U.K. DR, and U.K. Ordinary are dummy variables that equal one if a firm has a cross-listing of 
that type in a given year. Cross-listing dummies of a given type are excluded if there are less than 10 listings in a year. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year 
sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, and sales is in $ millions, adjusted for inflation. All regressions 
include country dummies (not reported). The t-statistics, in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are 
independent across countries, but not within countries. t-statistics greater than 1.65, 1.96, and 2.55 are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel b presents results from panel data regressions. The regressions are estimated three ways: 1) Fama-Macbeth, 2) pooled OLS with the standard errors 
corrected for clustering on firms, and 3) with firm-fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel  a.  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004  2005 
Constant  2.14 1.62 0.60 0.35 0.26 -0.12 0.11 -0.01  -0.42  -0.43  -0.55 -0.71  -0.36  -0.22  -0.18 -0.02 
  (5.09) (4.72) (2.41) (1.16) (0.81) -(0.34) (0.28) -(0.04)  -(2.29)  -(2.16)  -(1.36) -(3.70)  -(1.51)  -(1.74)  -(1.00) -(0.19) 
U.S.  Rule  144a  .  .  0.24 0.22 0.09  0.15  0.10 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.00 -0.04 -0.02 
  .  .  (1.84) (1.78) (1.22)  (1.46)  (0.95) (0.37) (0.13) (0.47) -(0.29) -(0.05)  -(0.19)  (0.07) -(0.57) -(0.20) 
U.S.  OTC  0.14 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.15  0.17  0.18 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.18  0.08  0.04  0.09 0.09  0.12 
  (1.47) (1.12) (1.29) (2.08) (3.02)  (4.13)  (3.26) (4.06) (3.16) (5.01) (3.10)  (2.27)  (1.12)  (3.07) (2.18)  (2.63) 
U.S.  Exchange  0.10 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.22  0.23  0.25 0.22 0.25 0.53 0.29  0.14  0.13  0.25 0.17  0.16 
  (1.88) (2.29) (1.90) (3.32) (5.25)  (5.08)  (5.02) (4.81) (5.08) (5.51) (2.96)  (2.51)  (2.76)  (6.15) (3.50)  (3.75) 
U.K.  AIM  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  .  . .  0.27 
  . . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  .  . .  (1.04) 
U.K.  DR  . . . . .  .  -0.15  0.08  0.07  0.18  0.00  0.09  -0.03  -0.05  -0.04  -0.14 
  . . . . .  .  -(1.48)  (0.39)  (0.57)  (0.59)  (0.03)  (0.87)  -(0.40)  -(0.79)  -(0.58)  -(2.45) 
U.K.  Ordinary  0.14  0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13  -0.12  -0.19 -0.14 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06  -0.01  0.01  -0.08 -0.06  -0.09 
  (1.50)  (0.49) -(0.66) -(0.49) -(1.74)  -(1.28)  -(1.67) -(1.72) -(0.73) -(0.07) -(0.70)  -(0.08)  (0.12)  -(1.27) -(0.89)  -(0.92) 
Sales  growth  0.10 0.11 0.26 0.62 0.39  0.29  0.47 0.54 0.52 0.79 0.52  0.39  0.32  0.35 0.50  0.35 
  (1.88) (2.67) (2.72) (3.73) (2.66)  (2.32)  (3.14) (4.87) (5.25) (4.20) (4.88)  (3.44)  (5.52)  (4.58) (3.61)  (4.38) 
Industry  Q  0.30 0.54 0.70 0.98 1.08  1.09  0.99 0.92 1.02 1.01 1.09  1.08  0.89  0.78 0.83  0.84 
  (2.44) (8.96) (5.62) (5.07) (6.92)  (4.73)  (4.88) (5.20) (5.45) (8.36) (7.73)  (15.24)  (11.34)  (8.89)  (13.59) (18.07) 
Log  (Sales)  -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02 
  -(2.28) -(2.06) -(1.10) -(2.44) -(2.58)  -(1.38)  -(1.35) (0.78)  (1.28)  (0.63)  (1.10)  (2.79)  (1.73)  (1.96)  (1.50)  (1.59) 
Observations  2764 3066 3418 3807 4186  4619  4811 5062 5403 5497 6029  6067  6572  6891 7292  7302 
Adjusted R
2  0.3397 0.2733 0.1755 0.2324 0.2076  0.1954  0.1739 0.2329 0.2665 0.2959 0.1676  0.1921  0.2233  0.2484 0.2077  0.2115   61
Table 9, continued. 
Panel b.  Fama-Macbeth    Pooled OLS    Firm fixed effects 
Constant 0.13    -0.29    0.73 
 (0.52)    (3.31)
***   (11.65)
*** 
U.S. Rule 144a  0.06    0.04    -0.02 
 (1.89)
*  (0.79)  -(0.64) 










U.K.  DR  0.00  -0.03  -0.21 
 (0.03)    -(0.37)    -(3.15)
*** 





Sales  growth  0.41  0.46  0.31 
 (7.66)
***   (22.58)
***  (33.44)
*** 





Log(Sales) -0.00    0.01    -0.05 
 -(0.17)    (2.04)
**   -(10.78)
*** 
Country  dummies  yes  yes  no 
Year  dummies  no  yes  yes 
       
Number  of  observations 82,786  82,786  82,786 
Number  of  groups  .  .   10,946 
R
2  0.2277  0.1645  0.1016 
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Table 10. Valuation changes around cross-listings: 1990 to 2005. 
This Table presents regression estimates of valuation changes around cross-listings in the U.S. or in the 
U.K. that took place between 1990 to 2005 The sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., non-U.K. 
firms that are in the Worldscope database and have total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in 
a given year or in the year of listing. Firms from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. 
Information on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. For each type of cross-
listing (in the U.S., Rule 144a, OTC, or Exchange; in the U.K., Depositary receipt, or Ordinary listing), an 
“event time” dummy variable is created, where year 0 is the cross-listing year for a given firm. The dummy 
variable, “> 3 years before listing” equals one for years prior to year -3 and is zero in all other years; “3 
years before listing” equals one in year -3; “2 years before listing” equals one in year -2, etc. Panel a shows 
the counts for each dummy variable by type of cross-listing. Panel b shows the regression results. The 
dependent variable in each regression is Tobin’s q, computed as ((Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market 
Value of Equity) / Total Assets (all variables are in local currency). Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-
year sales growth (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, and 
sales is in $ millions, inflation adjusted. Each regression includes country and year dummies (not reported). 
The  t-statistics, in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on firms – they are computed assuming 
observations are independent across firms, but not across time for each firm. F-test 1 tests the hypothesis 
that the coefficient on the dummy for “3 years after listings” is equal to the coefficient on the dummy for “3 
years before listing”. F-test 2 tests the hypothesis that the coefficient on the dummy for “>3 years after 
listings is equal to the coefficient on the dummy for “>3 years before listing”. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel a.  U.S. cross-listings   U.K.  cross-listings 




> 3 years before listing  147  634  577    23  39 
3 years before listing  64  195  156    13  16 
2 years before listing  82  236  196    14  21 
1 year before listing  119  277  238    18  26 
Listing  year  158 325 311    36  43 
1 year after listing  189  352  389    43  56 
2 years after listing  209  344  421    59  59 
3 years after listing  216  349  429    64  63 
> 3 years after listing  1,197  1,932  2,979    289  1,584   63
Table 10, continued. 
Panel b.  U.S. cross-listings    U.K. cross-listings 











> 3 years before listing  0.04  0.13  0.07    0.38  0.23 
 (0.35)  (2.10)
** (1.11)    (1.43)  (0.98) 
3 years before listing  0.12  0.17  0.13    0.57  0.04 





















***   (1.68)
* (0.56) 




***   (1.39)  (1.05) 
2 years after listing  0.10  0.05  0.26    0.05  0.06 
 (1.65)
* (1.48)  (5.14)
***   (0.37)  (0.55) 
3 years after listing  -0.03  0.02  0.28    0.04  -0.03 
 -(0.58)  (0.65)  (5.63)
***   (0.48)  -(0.36) 
> 3 years after listing  -0.04  0.09  0.21    -0.07  -0.01 
 -(0.93)  (2.61)
*** (5.93)
***   -(1.02)  -(0.17) 




***  ( 2 2 . 4 1 )
*** (13.10)
*** 




***  ( 2 3 . 9 0 )
*** (23.92)
*** 
Log(Sales)  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
 (4.29)
*** (4.01)
*** (1.57)    (4.33)
*** (4.45)
*** 
Number  of  observations  82854  83,003  82,945  82,810  82,824 




F-test 2  0.54  0.27  3.59
*  2.63  1.01 
Adjusted R
2  0.1599  0.1510  0.1681  0.1598  0.1574 
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Table 11. The cross-listing valuation premium before and after Sarbanes-Oxley. 
This Table presents results from panel data regressions that estimate the valuation differential of cross-listing 
in the U.S. before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). The period before SOX is 1990 to 2001 and the period 
after SOX is 2002 to 2005. In model (1), the sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S. firms that are in the 
Worldscope database and have total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms 
from Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are excluded. In model (2), U.K. firms are also excluded. Information 
on cross-listings comes from a variety of sources described in Table 1. The dependent variable in each 
regression is Tobin’s q, computed as ((Total Assets – Book Equity) + Market Value of Equity) / Total Assets 
(all variables are in local currency). U.S. Rule 144a, U.S. OTC, and U.S. Exchange are dummy variables that 
equal one if a firm has a cross-listing of that type in a given year. Post SOX equals 1 during 2002 to 2005. 
Models (3) and (4) repeat the same regressions as in (1) and (2), except they add the variable, “U.S. exchange 
× Post SOX × Low legal”, where Low legal is a dummy variable that equals one for firms from countries with 
below-median scores on legal and zero otherwise. Sales growth is inflation adjusted two-year sales growth 
(winsorized at 1% and 99% tails), global industry q is the median global industry q, and sales is in $ millions. 
The regressions are estimated by pooled OLS and the t-statistics are adjusted for clustering on firms – they 
are computed assuming observations are independent across firms, but not across time for each firm. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






U.S.  Rule  144a  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  (0.70) (0.67) (0.67) (0.64) 












U.S. Exchange × Post SOX  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.07 
  (0.48) (1.20) (1.08) (1.78)
* 
U.S. Exchange × Post SOX × Low legal      -0.10  -0.10 
     -(1.52)  -(1.59) 


















Country  dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes 
      
Number  of  observations  90,249 82,786 90,249 82,786 
Adjusted R
2  0.1720 0.1644 0.1721 0.1645   65
Table 12. Capital raising activity before and after cross-listing. 
This Table reports capital-raising activity from 1993-2002 by firms that cross-listed on U.S. exchanges or on the Main Market in the U.K. (as DRs or ordinary 
listings) within three years before and after the cross-listing date. It reports the number of cross-listing firms that raise capital by means of public and private 
issues, the aggregate quantity (in U.S. dollar millions) as well as the component activity (with percentage of total) taking place in the U.S. markets, the U.K. 
markets, the home market in which the firm is domiciled, and other markets. The “Before” (“After”) period presents all capital raising in the three year period 
before (after) the cross-listing. The “after” period also includes capital raised during the cross-listing event itself. The sample includes all non-financial, non-U.S., 
non-U.K. firms that are in the Worldscope database with total assets of at least $100 million (in 1990 dollars) in a given year. Firms from Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands are excluded. Capital raising data is obtained from SDC and is supplemented with data from the LSE. t-statistics are computed to test the 
differences in before/after means. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  U.S. exchange listings    U.K. ordinary listings 
 Before  After  t-statistic   Before  After  t-statistic 
Total # of firms  530  530      119  119   
     # of firms raising equity  61  157      7  30   
     % of all cross-listed firms  11.51%  29.62%      5.88%  25.21%   
Total Equity Raised  28,868.6  151,082.3  2.91
***  8,217.4  12,844.2  -0.11 
              
Total Raised at Home  14,841.3  79,173.1  2.02
**  4,938.4  6,695.2  -0.24 
     % of total raised  51.41%  52.40%      60.10%  52.13%   
Total Raised in US  3,150  17,076.9  2.64
***  1,441.9  981.6  -0.80 
     % of total raised  10.91%  11.30%      17.55%  7.64%   
Total Raised in UK  1,055.8  176.9  -1.59    0  700.7  1.64
* 
     % of total raised  3.66%  0.12%      0.00%  5.46%   
Total Raised in Other Markets  9,821.5  54,655.4  2.71
***  1,837.1  4,466.7  0.47 
     % of total raised  34.02%  36.18%      22.36%  34.78%   
 